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Abstract 
This project interrogates how economic self interest motivated periphery states such as 
Ghana to use foreign policy as a vehicle to attract improved development assistance from 
superpowers, in this case the United States. While the United States viewed its aid program in 
Ghana in stringently Cold War terms, Kwame Nkrumah and his advisors were less inclined to 
get deeply concerned about Cold War ideology. This project shows that Ghanaian agency was 
manifested in the Cold War through the new state's construction of a foreign policy image that 
made it a prominent African voice globally. It then examines how that image was then 
appropriated to meet domestic policy needs in modernization and industrialization. Adopting the 
globalist approach to Cold War history, this project postulates that national economic interests 
made Nkrumah shrewd and calculating in his relations with the U.S. This was done ostensibly to 
facilitate access to significant foreign aid from Washington for national development. To that 
end, Nkrumah constructed an international image as Africa's spokesperson to provide 
conspicuity to his own nation's needs in Washington and other centers of power. 
Ghana's story shows that the Cold War was a global phenomenon with enormous 
interactional valence among nations whether great or small, rich or poor. States such as Ghana 
used the Cold War environment to engage others to further its interests without an overzealous 
consideration for the ideological concerns of the West or East. The study concludes that though a 
militarily and economically less powerful state, Ghana, a periphery Cold War actor, manifested 
agency through tact in its external policy in a bipolarized global landscape. 
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1. Background 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
The gaining of independence by African countries in the 1950s and 1960s was an epic 
moment in the history of the twentieth century. For the first time in about seven decades, 
African people, constituted into organized modem states, were to take an active part in 
shaping the world's future. No one knew the nature and form of the contribution African 
states would make to international relations and world economics. However, other 
nations were beginning to weigh their responses and attitudes to these emerging African 
states. These responses were preludes to the larger relationship the continent would have 
with other states. The United States, aside from the European powers and Russia, was the 
most interested in the region at this time, mainly because of Africa's natural resources 
and the political force it promised in world affairs. It was in this spirit that American 
policy towards the continent was formulated. 
The relations between the two regions could be traced to 1619 when the first 
Dutch shipment of African slaves arrived on the U.S. coast. 1 Throughout the centuries, 
the United States had limited relations with Africa due mainly to Europe's dominance on 
the continent through colonialism. Also, the United States' limited voice and impact in 
international affairs during the 1800s also made it impossible for it to take a preeminent 
role in African affairs. 
1 Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola, The United States and West Africa: Interactions and 
Relations (Rochester: University Rochester Press, 2008), chap. 1. This book provides a 
detailed examination of U.S. relations with West African. In the introduction, the authors 
give a summary of U.S. relations with the sub-continent from the 1600s to the American 
revolutionary wars. 
1 
However, with its rise as a superpower in the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. was 
obliged to take a new view of Africa in an effort to create a strong global presence and 
appeal. This necessity was further driven home by the emergence of Soviet antagonism to 
U.S. hegemony.2 Soviet power made it impossible for the U.S. to ignore Africa even if 
Washington policy makers saw lesser economic good in focusing on Africa. 3 Russia also 
saw new African states as prime targets for the spread of Communist ideals and 
experimentation of its own ideologies of development. Prospects of communist influence 
and the global spread of socialist development models frightened the U.S. and made its 
interest in Africa one of necessity rather than choice. In other words, democracy, 
capitalism and American exceptionalism must, according to U.S. policymakers, compete 
wherever communism could exist. This Soviet and American struggle created a bipolar 
world order, a global power system dominated by two superpowers. This came with an 
attendant tension called the Cold War in which these two nations and their allies engaged 
in subtle struggles against each without getting to the situation of open warfare between 
the two nations. 
U.S. support for Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis, the presence of Vice 
President Richard M. Nixon's at Ghana's independence ceremony, and Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller (R-NY) presence at Nigeria's independence were all the markers of 
2 The referent Soviet will be used interchangeably with the noun Russia. 
3 A number of factors may have accounted for this. American foreign policy for the first 
half of the century, according to Emily Rosenberg, was driven by business interests. 
Because much of the resources in Africa were also available in South America and Asia, 
economic interest in the region was less pronounced in Washington. Again, the presence 
of colonial forces and the probability of their continued control over the region after 
independence made it less appealing to focus on Africa except to endorse the global reach 
of U.S. power as a hegemon. See, Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: 
American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1982). 
2 
increasing U.S. interest in Africa. Despite these, Africa was on the periphery in U.S. scale 
of priorities in the early years of the Cold War. The Marshall Plan, the key economic 
policy instrument in shaping the Cold War in Europe, was never extended to Africa. Yet, 
the general expectation was that African nations would become benevolent partners 
against Communism in the global south. The oscillation between neglect and attention, 
courting and abandonment, and total uncertainty over policy direction in Africa in 
Washington was the striking feature of U.S. Africa policy in the years immediately after 
the Second World War.4 
For African leaders in the early decades after independence, the choice of forging 
a relationship with the United States and other economically endowed nations was one of 
necessity. African leaders desired the prosperity of rich nations for their own nation-
states. A bipolar world meant many leaders had the choice of pursuing two rival blocs for 
cooperation towards development that could lift their people from poverty, illiteracy and 
disease. But this sometimes meant walking in the dangerous line between two rival 
ideological blocs. Playing different powers against each other was not new to Africans. 
At coastal trading posts like Cape Coast and Lagos during pre-colonial and colonial 
times, African rulers and traders mastered the art of playing big European powers against 
each other for access to trade routes, royalties, coastal fortresses and other resources. 5 But 
the East-West rivalry after the war differed from the earlier power play of earlier times. 
The modem struggle among the powers was ideological and multifaceted rather than 
wholly economic. This put African nations in a new, difficult situation. Some African 
4 Henceforth, 'the war.' 
5 D.E.K Amenumey, Ghana: A Concise History from Pre-Colonial Tmes to the 20th 
Century (Accra: Woeli Publication Services, 2008). 
3 
leaders saw opportunity in the situation and wanted to exploit the superpowers for 
national development. However, the majority still "oscillated between dependency, 
searching for the 'best deal' in terms of economic and state-building support."6 Debates 
about greater engagement or passivity on the international scene were therefore not 
susceptible to easy answers in the presidential capitals of many African nations in the few 
years after independence. 
When the concept of Third Worldism was coined in France, many nations of the 
global south used it to find voice for their aspirations and intentions on the international 
scene. African countries such as Ghana used this idea in global politics to push for moral 
primacy on the international stage. So, where the coercive might of the superpowers 
appeared dominant, the moral high ground and solidarity of Third Worldism hoped to 
challenge it. Ghana, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and India formed this first camp of 
non-aligned nations. Some countries, such as Nigeria, never championed any concept of 
an organized non-aligned group and were against any form of blocs- Communists or 
capitalists- of any kind in international affairs. They saw all blocs as inevitably corrupt 
and bias. Instead, Nigeria was unique in that it favored a neutral, non-involvement 
position in superpower politics both in words and deeds. 7 This group represented the 
second camp of non-alignment. Presumptions among Third World forces were that non-
aligned nations could counter the weight of the great powers in global decision-making at 
such fora as the United Nations (U.N) without fear. Ultimately, the West and East worked 
hard to win the support of the global south throughout much of the Cold War. 
6 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War in the Third World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 106. 
7 Olajide Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1977), chap. 9. 
4 
Conversely, the nations of the south sought to use the Cold War as an instrument for 
transforming national economies and ensuring the development of their nations at the 
expense of the superpowers. 
What then is the Third World? For many scholars, the Third World denoted 
countries in the geographic south with less economic power. 8 These nations were referred 
to, sometimes, as the global south, as the developing countries, or as the non-aligned 
nations during the Cold War. In another sense, these states were non-European and non-
white. They suffered colonial rule and possessed weak governmental and institutional 
structures. Ethnic and religious heterogeneity was a key marker of such nations. Most of 
them assumed monolithic political identity through administrative demarcations and 
unifications under colonial rule. Because they were ethnically and religiously 
heterogeneous, they tended to have varied communal histories and identities which 
attracted loyalty first before the state, a newer, artificial creation. Nations here defined 
themselves based on their common experiences of external domination and their 
aspirations for economic progress. Conceptually, they saw the global north as ex-imperial 
powers, European, white and economically endowed nations. The global north was also 
called the First World, the West or the developed world. There was a second category of 
nations who were called the second world. It was an ideological identification during the 
Cold War. Russia and its allies identified themselves as the Second World of 
technologically advanced nations but with limited economic power. 
8 Jason C. Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the 
Formation of the Third World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); McMahon, The 
Cold War in the Third World. 
5 
The Third World came into political relevance as nation-states m the mid-
twentieth century after suffering colonial rule and decades of economic exploitation. 9 The 
idea of the Third World might also be looked at as global in terms of increasing 
inequality, poverty, illiteracy, disease and absence of social protection throughout nations 
in the world, the First World included. Caroline Thomas, writing about the post-Cold 
War years, observed that "the Third World, far from disappearing, is becoming global." 10 
Thomas here referred to the growing inequality and inequity inherent in all societies 
throughout the world. But in this present work, the Third World is taken to mean the 
geographic regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The discussion of this idea of the 
Third World here is to rightly position Ghana into the geopolitical space it was 
supposedly categorized during the period of this study. This categorization set it apart 
from the U.S. in political and cultural terms. It is this conceptual separation that makes it 
possible to understand the nature of the interrelation between the Ghana and the United 
States. 
2. Research Focus 
The interactionist proposition of global south agency in the Cold War is the 
framework adapted for this work. This approach aims at studying the Cold War as an 
interactive phenomenon rather than solely an interventionist one. While there were some 
forms of intervention, they occurred through interactions, so that even interventions were 
9 Moses Allor Awinsong, "The Colonial Testament: An Economic Re-Interpretation of 
Europe's Motives for Colonizing Africa," International Journal of Humanities and 
Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (October 6, 2015), http://ijhss.net/index.php/ijhss/article/view/86. 
1° Caroline Thomas, "Developing Inequality: a Global Fault-line." In The New Agenda 
for International Relations: From Polarization to Globalization in World Politics? Edited 
by Stephanie Lawson (Hoboken, New Jersey:John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 71. 
6 
actually negotiations between the leaders in those countries and the superpowers. The 
arguments of Connelly, Parker, Leffler and Painter, and McMahon provide the analytical 
framework within which this research is situated. 11 
This project will interrogate how economic self interest took center stage in 
Ghana's foreign policy choices towards the United States. While the United States 
viewed Ghana and its aid program there in stringently Cold War terms, Nkrumah and his 
advisors were less inclined to conceptualize their relations with the U.S. in such strict 
ideological terms. Rather, Ghana used its nationhood and the choices it made in external 
relations to advance an agenda of better material gain from economic powerhouses such 
as the United States for national development. This contrast in aims led to some 
deterioration ofU.S.-Ghana relations in the mid-1960s. This way, Ghana's story indicates 
that the Cold War was a global phenomenon but not always in the ideological sense for 
some nations. Ghana used the Cold War environment to help further its interests without 
an overzealous concern for the ideological apprehensions of the West or East. As a 
militarily and economically less powerful state, Ghana showed agency and tact in its 
decisions to act in an economically self interested matter within a bipolarized global 
context. Generally, the globalist argument that the Cold War is an international history 
provides the methodological basis for this research to pull together the stories of Ghana 
and the United States in ways that further our understanding of the Cold War. 
Understanding Ghana's story of agency will contribute to the globalist literature 
to Cold War studies. This approach has been championed by historians such Odd Ame 
Westad, Matthew Connelly, and Zaki Laidi contending for subaltern, peripheral voices in 
11 These scholars are discussed in the historiography that follows. 
7 
studying the Cold War.12 Investigating Ghana's Cold War story in the way this project 
does furthers the globalist literature of giving voice to less prominent actors in 
international relations and history. The project will also provide a revisionist study of 
Nkrumah that departs from the traditional ideology-based assessment of Nkrumah and his 
foreign policy choices. Also, the frequent tendency to see Nkrumah's administration as 
belligerent towards the U.S. and leaning East is shown to be insufficient in explaining the 
forging of Ghana's foreign policy during the early years of independence. Reevaluating 
Nkrumah's motives and actions provides a better means to understand options Ghana 
chose in those infant years of nationhood. I argue that national economic self interest and 
a desire to move Ghana into the rank of endowed nations informed Nkrumah's 
complexity of responses to the international policy choices. When looked at this way, the 
vagaries in Nkrumah's foreign policy actions over the years can then be better understood 
and appreciated. 
Research Questions 
The following questions will guide this study: 
(a) how interactional were the relations between the United States and Ghana? 
(b) what were the foreign policy ends of the United States in Ghana during the 
early years of Ghana's independence? 
(c) how did Ghana's foreign policy choices in the U.N. impact its economic 
diplomatic gains from Washington? 
12 These scholars are detailed in the historiography section. 
8 
In other words, how did domestic economic need shape the character of Ghana's external 
political relations? How tactical were Ghanaian leaders in constructing a global external 
policy aimed at gaining adequate economic aid from the United States? These questions 
are guided by the proposition that Ghana's external political relations were largely 
informed by economic needs at home to meet the goal of national development. This 
made Ghana construct a foreign policy image to support efforts attracting development 
support for domestic needs at home. 
During the Cold War, African governments with favorable disposition towards the 
West received greater aid while the inverse was true. This belief that aid should be used 
as foreign policy bait was clearly articulated in a formal review of U.S. aid known as the 
Korry Report (1970): "development assistance provided directly by the U.S. should 
secure political support for the U.S. on current issues."13 Whether this had always been a 
major U.S. policy guideline pursued from very early on in the Cold War throughout the 
world during this period is unknown. But the specific case of Ghana under Nkrumah, a 
government that came before the Korry Report was issued suggests that U.S. aid policy 
was tied to the foreign policy of recipient nations. After several years of positive relations 
marked by significant U.S. aid to Ghana, U.S. decision makers cut aid amounts 
13 President's Foreign Aid Program, (n.d), Foreign Relations of United States, 1969-
1976, Volume 4, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, Ed. 
Bruce F. Duncombe, (Washington, 2001), Document 123. Hereafter, FRUS. For full 
summary ofresport, see, Draft Summary of Korry Report on Foreign Assistance, (n.d), 
FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume 4, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade 
Policies, Ed. Bruce F. Duncombe, (Washington, 2001), Document 124. 
9 
downwards due to a feeling that Ghana was uncooperative in international and regional 
African issues. 
Later, the Busia administration of Ghana adopted a more conforming outlook 
towards the West marked specially by its policy of dialogue with Apartheid South Africa. 
The policy shift was much appreciated in Washington. In 1969, the year Busia took over, 
foreign aid hit $128 million and $153 million in 1970. The Acheampong regime that 
followed Busia, in comparison, was belligerent towards the West. In 1972, the year 
Acheampong overthrew Busia, U.S. aid was $68 million. It was $105 million in 1973, 
$24 million in 1974 and $27 million in 1975. Even the highest annual return of $105 
million under Acheampong, with his rather hostile, pan-Africanist external outlook, was 
lower than Busia's lowest year of U.S. aid flow because Busia had a foreign policy that 
looked more towards the West, particularly Washington. 
3. The Historiography 
A. Nkrumah in the literature 
The earliest studies touching on Nkrumah were also treatises on Ghana's political history. 
T. Peter Omari, in 1970, provided one early criticism and complete condemnation of 
Nkrumah and his political legacy in Ghana and Africa. 14 Omari held that the excesses of 
the Nkrumah administration were down to his vindictive and dishonest character. 
Nkrumah was also portrayed as highly unqualified and only got far by victimizing and 
oppressing his more intellectually qualified contemporaries. Omari saw Nkrumah's 
wickedness and overall disposition as symbolic of the Ghanaian national character: "He 
14 T. Peter Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship (London: 
C. Hurst & Company, 1970). 
10 
was all that was good and all that was bad among Ghanaians- a true reflection of the 
Ghanaian personality."15 Similarly, George B.N Ayittey viewed Nkrumah as essentially 
setting a bad example for future African leaders to emulate in his decision to focus on 
exposing the evils of colonialism, complaining about racial discrimination, and 
condemning imperialism.16 Ayittey thought African leaders should had concentrated 
more on national economic development and transformation than the politics of 
difference. So negatively influential was Nkrumah that Ayittey contended that, 
"tragically for Africa, one country after another, with deadly consistency, followed in his 
footsteps: Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, and a host of others. 
Predictably, in each country tyranny followed, economies were ruined and the 
nationalists were ousted by the military."17 However, these studies do not point out the 
complexity of issues Nkrumah faced and the equal complexity of his administration's 
responses and policy choices. 
In a collection of works on Nkrumah's life, leading Ghanaian intellectuals 
examined the pervasive influence of Nkrumah's leadership in every aspect of Ghanaian 
society.18 This work, a major piece in the corpus on Nkrumah studies, focused mainly on 
domestic affairs and African policy. While it provides insight into the administration at 
home, the authors did not address the complexity of Nkrumah's foreign policy responses. 
This highlights a continued narrative in Nkrumah studies which emphasize his stature in 
African affairs and do not extend the gaze beyond to understand Nkrumah's external 
15 Omari, 154. 
16 George B.N Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). 
17 Ayittey, 170. 
18 Kwame Arhin, ed., The Life and Works of Kwame Nkrumah (Accra: Sedco Publishing 
Limited, 1991 ). 
11 
policy and their relations with domestic aims nor the nuanced nature of the 
administration's external relations with major centers of power. In a much more balance 
work, Arna Biney acknowledged the debate over Nkrumah stating that his legacy is 
"shrouded in considerable ambivalence and controversy."19 She then went on to analyze 
the political, social and cultural thoughts of Nkrumah. Biney argued that "Nkrumah was 
profoundly motivated by an ideological vision of radical socioeconomic development for 
both Ghana and a united Africa along socialist lines."20 While materiality was important 
in Nkrumah's policy, Biney's study did not address the impact of this materiality on 
Nkrumah's foreign policy especially towards Washington. David Rooney also identified 
national development as inherently responsible for Nkrumah's attitude to global powers.21 
Rooney concluded, rather preemptively, that Nkrumah " ... naively, looked for the support 
of both the capitalist and the communist worlds" in an effort to facilitate Ghana's 
economic and industrial transformation. 22 The book held that Nkrumah was "a man of 
vision whose achievements were undermined by the inadequacy of his administration. "23 
Those domestic inadequacies included corruption, inefficient management of state 
enterprises, a bloated state bureaucracy, and Nkrumah's inability to rein in members of 
his own party. 
While these studies were significant contributions in the historiography of 
Nkrumah studies, they did not provide a nuanced understanding of the complexities not 
19 Arna Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: 
Springer, 2011), 1. 
20 Biney, 4. 
21 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 
2007). 
22 Rooney, 10. 
23 Rooney, 11. 
12 
only of Nkrumah's person, but of the domestic needs, international climate and policy 
choices available for the administration. This work will add this historiographical gap by 
providing understanding of Nkrumah's complexity of action on foreign policy informed 
by domestic policy needs. I seek to revise the simplistic categorization of the Nkrumah 
administration as pro-Western or pro-Eastern, good or bad, and progressive or 
retrogressive. This study will argue that there was much more complexity in Nkrumah's 
relations with other powers especially Washington due to Ghana's domestic needs and 
that in navigating these forces, Ghana demonstrated agency in the Cold War climate. 
B. Foreign Economic Aid in Africa during the Cold War 
Foreign economic aid was probably the most significant source of leverage for American 
policy makers in their relations with Africa during the Cold War. Gordon Cumming has 
argued that French and British aid to African nations during the Cold War stemmed from 
a number of motives.24 The first was appreciation of the role the colonial people played in 
the defeat of German aggression in the world wars. Second, the pressure from the United 
States for access to colonial markets previously blocked by imperial powers forced old 
European imperialists, at this time dependent on U.S. aid themselves, to forge new 
relationships using economic tools to remain relevant in ex-colonies. The United States 
also impressed on Europeans the need to start aid programs to Africa so as to share the 
aid burden with the United States. Cumming explains that French aid focused on black 
Africa with emphasis on bilateral, then multilateral, and later global aid initiatives in 
Africa. British aid went to only colonies until 1958 when independent states previously 
24 Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the 
New Millennium (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
13 
under the crown were considered for continuous assistance. Aid was generally used to 
advocate British economic and political interests overseas though moral aims define 
British aid allocation for a while in 1970s. Cumming therefore shows aid to Africa during 
the Cold War as one that was begun for strategic reasons and continued for the same 
strategic purposes throughout the Cold War. 
Supporting Cumming's argument, Thad Dunning, in a significant study, argued 
that U.S. foreign aid to Africa during the Cold War was not conditioned on recipients 
practicing democratic governance or otherwise. 25 That policy supposedly contrasts with 
the intent of aid in the post-Cold War years where recipients' adoption of democratic 
governance determined the aid amounts they received. Democracy and progressive 
governance did not translate into better aid necessarily during the Cold War but were 
considered key in aid decisions in the post-Cold War era. Dunning identified geopolitical 
ends as having a far important role in choices made by U.S. officials in aid allocation to 
Africa during the pre-1990 years. This meant that western aid and U.S. aid in particular, 
was felt to be necessary in an effort to keep global south leaders close or, at least, non-
hostile to western interests in the ideological struggle between east and west. 
Tobias Broich posits that U.S. aid to the global south, especially Africa, was 
steeped in strategic considerations.26 Focusing on American and Russian competition in 
the Hom of Africa region, Broich explains that aid drove the changing alliances amongst 
25 Thad Dunning, "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, 
and Democracy in Africa," International Organization 58, no. 2 (April 2004): 409-23, 
https://doi.org/10.1017 /S0020818304582073. 
26 Tobias Broich, US and Soviet Foreign Aid during the Cold War: A Case Study of 
Ethiopia, No. 010 (United Nations University-Maastricht Economic and Social Research 
Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT), 2017). 
14 
the U.S., the Soviet Union, Somalia, and Ethiopia during the Cold War. Ethiopia moved 
from being an ally to becoming a foe of the U.S. due in large part to increased Russian 
aid to its national budget following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974. When the 
Carter administration withheld more than $6 million of critical aid from the Ethiopian 
regimes over allegations of human rights abuses, the Derg regime of Ethiopia shifted 
gears from west to east. Aid therefore appeared to have been the overriding reason for the 
policy shifts in Ethiopia. In this sense, it is not too far-fetched to conclude that American 
aid was the glue that sustained the U.S.-Ethiopian friendship until the Derg severed those 
relations. For Broich, a key policy outcome was that Ethiopia and Somalia, while they 
sought to maximize the in-flow of foreign aid, struggled to sustain their sovereignty 
without which independence of thought and action became impossible. In Ethiopia, 
American aid effectively facilitated Washington's ability to project power in the Hom of 
Africa region. Therefore overriding strategic and geopolitical demands of the Cold War 
was responsible for the placement of aid to certain nations. Broich, however, notes that 
occasional humanitarian concerns sometimes impacted allocations of aid but not in the 
same way as strategic motives did. Foreign aid thus made African recipients' more 
susceptible to following through on U.S. directions. 
Nikolaos Zahariadis, Rick Travis, and James B. Ward also explained that foreign 
aid, especially food aid, distributions from Washington to African governments during 
the Cold War defied a need based criterion.27 Rather, such aid went out to governments 
more aligned to American global interests and positions. Food aid given to some states on 
bilateral concessional terms was conditioned on the proceeds being ploughed into 
27Nikolaos Zahariadis, Rick Travis, and James B. Ward, "U.S. Food Aid to Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Politics or Philanthropy?," Social Science Quarterly 81, no. 2 (2000): 663-76. 
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recipients' economy to strengthen agriculture. This avoided the situation where food aid 
of this nature could fall in the hands of regimes out of tune with American geopolitical 
and economic interests. But in the 1980s, eighty-three percent (83%) of food aid given 
for humanitarian purposes, under what Zahariadis, Rick, and Ward termed as Title II, 
were need based or truly humanitarian. This does not, however, negate the fact that food 
aid, especially those made under concessional terms, were a political tool used by 
Western decision makers during the Cold War. The authors then held that when food aid 
was considered under the form described as Title I, much political rather than 
philanthropic considerations were the basis for those decisions. Conversely, those 
donated under Title II were less tainted with the practical, crude political calculations of 
the Cold War. The authors concluded that the question surrounding food aid was not 
whether a recipient nation should be given such aid but how much aid was appropriate for 
that country. In answering questions of quantum, Washington politicians eventually 
tolerated political calculations in shaping the levels of aid given to nations in the Africa 
during the last years of the Cold War. 
Anne Boschini and Anders Olofsgard used available aid data from the Cold War 
to put forward that United States aid levels to poorer nations decreased significantly as 
the Cold War drew to a close.28 They correlated military and development aid at the 
height of the Cold War to concerns Washington had about the Warsaw Pact nations' aid 
to emerging countries. When the struggle came to an end in the Bush administration, the 
western aid givers, especially the United States, reduced aid amounts to developing 
28Anne Boschini and Anders Olofsgard, "Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Fighting 
Communism?," The Journal of Development Studies 43, no. 4 (May 1, 2007): 622--48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380701259707. 
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nations. The Cold War therefore shaped Washington politicians' choices about what, how 
much and who to give aid to during the Cold War. The conclusion here was a departure 
from looking at the role of aid in securing U.S. economic interests to exploring how 
changing aid levels from the centers of power, at the height of the Cold War to its last 
days, reflected a concern with threats to western safety. Reduced existential threats to 
Western allies led to decreased aid allocations to poorer nations. Aid was therefore a 
function of strategy and geopolitics. 
But why did the U.S. take a forward role in aid allocation to Africa? Geir 
Lundestad pointed out that power, the ability to influence and shape others' actions, 
motivated not only Soviet but American generosity after the war. 29 Through economic 
institutional systems like the Bretton Woods bodies, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States ably exercised subtle 
influences over both allies and emerging Third World nations. Added to this, according to 
Lundestad, was the adoption of the dollar as the standard currency of exchange. These 
developments placed the United States in a position where it could use its economic 
power to extract political compliance and camaraderie from allies and potential foes. Due 
to postwar reconstruction in Europe and the quest for development in emerging Third 
World nations, the United States gained affluence through this control of the financial 
and economic institutions shaping the recovery of the world's economies. Lundestad 
commented about this time that "virtually every country in the world received some form 
of economic support ... the United States was the most important source of such 
29Geir Lundestad, The Rise and Decline of the American "Empire": Power and Its Limits 
in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chap. 1. 
17 
support."30 So, global south states gave attentive ears to U.S. interests in exchange for the 
subsidizations necessary for their survival. It was a case of trading power for capital and 
subventions, concluded Lundestad. Hegemonic power, the idea that one nation could 
dominate others through a system of institutions or rules, Lundestad argued, was the 
undeniable motivation for U.S. economic generosity and philanthropy on the global stage 
during the Cold War. 
The literature buttresses that foreign aid decisions in Washington had a political, 
strategic and ideological bend to it commensurate with the global politics of the times. 
Such a general position must, however, be tested against the hard facts of history. 
However, the voice of recipient leaders remained silent in the literature why and how 
they sought and received aid from the U.S. In this study, I examine whether the 
supposition that U.S. aid herded periphery leaders' westwards held true for U.S.-Ghana 
relations under Nkrumah. 
C. The Third World in the Cold War 
The Cold War was a struggle for power without open confrontation between the 
two superpowers- the United States and the Soviet Union. Because two superpowers were 
involved, scholars who postulated the origins and nature of the Cold War were inevitably 
drawn to lean towards one or the other in apportioning blame for the start of the 
disagreement. Two clear positions on the Cold War's origin emerged, namely, the 
orthodox/traditional school and the revisionist school. They differ on who is to blame for 
the Cold War. 
30Lundestad, 15. 
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The Orthodox school was a western apologia for the origins of the Cold War. It 
posited that Soviet threat of aggression and global expansion into Europe forced a 
western response led by the United States. The struggle was the inevitable outcome of a 
race between socialism and capitalism which compelled the U.S. to pursue "a policy of 
firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at 
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and 
stable world. ,m By the 1970s other scholars had begun challenging this monolithic 
western construction of the Cold War. The revisionists saw American aims of global 
economic dominance as the cause of the competition with Russia. Revisionist held that 
America sought to curb the only threat to its ability to create an economic empire by 
launching psychological, economic, and even, proxy military confrontations against the 
Soviet Union to silence that country.32 Revisionism as a Cold War ideology placed more 
blame for the silent struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States on the latter. 
Melveyn P. Leffler also noted that American interests and concerns were largely 
economic, financial and political with no direct Soviet threat to Europe or the United 
States in any way.33 In time, John L. Gaddis and Geir Lundestad among others, often 
labeled post-revisionists, refuted the two positions by arguing that both the United States 
31 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (London: Martin Secker and 
Warburg Ltd, 1952), 123. Kennan belonged to this school of Cold War historians. 
Another foundational scholar of traditional Cold War historiography is Thomas Bailey. 
See his work, Thomas Andrew Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People 
(Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1974). 
32 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. (New York: WW 
Norton & Company, 1988). 
33 Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International 
History (New York: Routledge, 2005). Leffler and Painter explain that the Soviet military 
and economy in the postwar era were weak relative to the U.S. They argue there was no 
Soviet threat as portrayed by the American government. 
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and the Soviet Union were responsible for the Cold War.34 Post-revisionists therefore 
viewed the Cold War as an outcome of U.S. paranoia of Soviet abilities, intentions and 
strategies. Scholars of this approach unanimously accept the assumption of the 
revisionists that economic motives underscored Cold War hostilities but disagree that 
America was solely responsible for the confrontation. They also reject 
traditionalist/orthodox propositions about Stalin's intents of a Communist Europe 
through an expansionist design. Post-revisionism helped synthesized the evidence of the 
earlier two approaches to propose a more comprehensive and all-encompassing argument 
for the Cold War. 
These positions did not place much emphasis on the Third World as a central 
component of the Cold War. It took years before scholars of the West and East begun 
extending their intellectual gaze to include the periphery when seeking to understand the 
Cold War. The rise of transnational history questioned the monolithic representation of 
the Cold War as one of bipolarity. The actions, input and roles of peripheral nations and 
people were reconstructed beginning in the 1990s. Third World voices were now viewed 
as significant in the start and evolution of the Cold War. Transnational history interpreted 
the Cold War as a global interaction among diverse people. In this sense, the Third World 
nations played an important role in eliciting superpower reactions and in responding to 
superpower action. 35 The peripheral nations moved from being grounds for bipolar 
confrontation to central actors in the historical process. Transnational history highlights 
34John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the 
Cold War," Diplomatic History 7, no. 3 (July 1, 1983): 171-90, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1983.tb00389.x; Geir Lundestad, "The Cold War 
According to John Gaddis," Cold War History 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 535-42, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740600979303. 
35Broich, US and Soviet Foreign Aid during the Cold War: A Case Study of Ethiopia. 
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the Third World's impact, adaptation and construction of the Cold War as a felt historical 
phenomenon. The period birthed interconnections, novelties and understandings that 
weakened duality as a conceptual foundation for studying the Cold War. Mathew 
Connelly goes as far as to arguing that the east-west struggle was superseded by the 
north-south contention over racism and colonialism.36 To this end, the Third World took 
center stage in intellectual analysis and synthesis about the Cold War. A new school 
called the globalist approach emerged that saw the Cold War as an international history 
involving all nations. A reading of the literature reveals that some globalist scholars saw 
the Third World as a passive place available for superpower maneuvering while others 
held that the Third World was not a passive ground for superpower politics but a place 
where interactions between the powerful and weak states took place. 
Interventionism 
The interventionists approach, espoused since the early 1990s include such works 
as those by Immanuel W allerstein, Elizabeth Schmidt, Odd Westad, Zaki Lai di, and 
Kimie Hara. The interventionist argument held that superpowers intervened in the Third 
World at will to protect vital interests. 37 Immanuel Wallerstein, writing in 1991, noted 
that the Third World suffered economically because the superpowers gave it little voice 
36 Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence 
and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
37 Zaki LaYdi, The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention 
in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013); Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in 
the San Francisco System (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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"in the political arena, and even less in the economic arena" in global affairs. 38 Pursuing 
the twin goals of self-determination and national development, Third World states found 
that they were increasingly ignored in the north while interventions in global south affairs 
could be carried out at will by nations of the north. Wallerstein argued that while Third 
World nations achieved self-autonomy, sometimes at high cost, the goal of national 
development was never realized due to this intrusive nature of the Cold War on Third 
World economies and well-being. Superpowers sought to replace colonial powers by 
influencing local affairs often with devastating effects on the Third World. Rising debts, 
lack of technology to fuel the productive process, and the determination of the 
superpowers to keep the global south as a market for manufactured goods from the 
recovering economies of the North all worked to limit the capacity of the global south or 
the Third World to achieve national development and economic progress. Zaki Laidi 
similarly argued that Soviet and American interventions and activities in Africa worked 
to the detriment of the people and the development process in many countries. 39 Ignoring 
Africa's peculiar historical and economic context, superpowers intervened on the 
continent to demonstrate the efficacy of their respective development models. They had 
no genuine concern for the economic and security needs of the people in the Third World. 
Laidi saw interventions by external powers as motivated by a desire to assure the 
intervening powers' economic and ideological supremacy rather than bettering the needs 
of Africans. Laidi concludes, concerning superpowers, that: "Their concern is thus less to 
38 Immanuel J. Wallerstein, "The Cold War and the Third World: The Good Old Days" 
(Binghampton, New York: Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, 
Historical Systems, and Civilizations, 1990), 16. 
39 Zaki Lai"di, The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
22 
promote 'socialism' or 'liberalism' than to dissuade their respective clients from ... ends 
that are incompatible with their own global priorities". 40 
Also, Elizabeth Schmidt considered the Third World as a space controlled and 
manipulated by the great powers, namely the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, 
France, and Belgium.41 In her work, Foreign Interventions in Africa, Schmidt argued that 
"many of the predicaments that plague the continent today are not solely the result of 
African decisions but also the consequence of foreign intrusion into African affairs. "42 
External interventions from former colonial powers, military and political, were focused 
on setting up client regimes to assure the powers' economic interest. For superpowers, the 
aim was to ensure transfer of authority to moderate regimes to advance certain 
ideological and economic models of development which furthered imperial or neo-
imperial economic interests. Despite her caution that African nations were not wholly 
agentless, the strength of her argument about external influence as emphasized in her 
study makes it clear that the Cold War was practically an external invasion of Africa. 
Writing on Asia, Kimie Hara emphasized the regionalized nature of superpower 
politics during the Cold War. In her work Cold War frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, she 
argued that the Cold War birthed subtle, indirect superpowers involvement militarily and 
strategically in the Third World.43 This led to a situation where "instead of a direct clash 
between the USA and the USSR, Asian lands became surrogate battlefields between 
40 La'idi, 195-96. 
41 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa. 
42 Schmidt, 1. 
43Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific. 
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capitalism and socialism. "44 Third World states became places of hot war because the 
superpowers had created and superintended the signature of ambiguous peace treaties. 
Later, the superpowers' disagreements over such treaties became the grounds for 
confrontation in the Third World through proxy wars. Regionalization, for Hara, turned 
the Third World into a site for hot war for the superpowers. So, intervention in the Third 
World during Cold War years came from external powers and such interventions shaped 
the structure of relations among nations in the global south. 
Ode Arne Westad's magisterial work, The Global Cold War, became the most 
significant book on the Third World's experience of the global ideological and economic 
disagreement between East and the West.45 In this vast, groundbreaking work, Westad 
coalesced all the arguments of the globalists by underscoring that the Cold War was a 
confrontation of global proportions, that it involved superpower interventions, and that 
Third World nations exercised responses to superpower initiatives. He acknowledged that 
superpowers' actions became the basis for "international and domestic framework within 
which political, social, and cultural changes in Third World countries took place."46 This 
proposition by Westad is understandable given the financial, military, and technological 
influence the superpowers possessed. They could and did deploy those resources to 
counter each other's moral, ideological and political influence across many nations. 
44 4 Hara, . 
450dd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Though other global 
approaches have emerged since this publication, they mostly adopt a Westadian approach 
to analyzing the nations they cover. This has buttressed the relevance of this work in 
setting the historiographical direction of the globalist school and of Cold War studies 
generally. 
46Westad, 3., 
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Despite this, Westad observed that post-colonial global south leaders, the colonial 
hybrids, sought to "conquer modernity for themselves."47 
Specifically, Third World states sought and used the new technologies and forms 
of social, economic and political organizations that promised national progress. In doing 
so, these leaders understood that "foreign countries that provided the aid were out to 
interfere with the domestic and international direction their state moved in."48 Westad, 
however, saw Third World efforts at keeping the superpowers at bay as not very 
successful. The superpowers did intervene in Africa, Asia and Latin America to set in 
motion their notions and convictions about how and what the world should be or could 
be. Though he underscored the futility of interventions and the pain it caused, Westad 
saw such interventions as representing the globalized nature of the Cold War. The 
struggle between East and West was also not necessarily ideological but policy oriented. 
Soviet and American roles and involvement, as well-intentioned as they were, were 
aimed at achieving Soviet exceptionalism or American exceptionalism. The U.S. and the 
Soviet Union developed and endorsed a teleological view of the world. It was the quest to 
achieve that view and understanding that led to large scale and far reaching involvement 
in the Third World nations with unsavory outcomes for those countries. 
The view of the Third World as less powerful and a space for external superpower 
intervention and demonstration of military, economic, and ideological capacity portrayed 
that the north had limitless power in the affairs of the Third World. Soviets, Americans, 
Britons, and French men became active agents in determining the shape and destiny of 
47Westad, 79. 
48 Westad, 96. 
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Third World nations throughout the years before 1990. More importantly, the immense 
agency of European actors suggested by this argument presumes a null and secondary 
level of agency to Third World actors. The Third World was supposedly powerless and 
weak; a victim of intervention by the superpowers and their respective secondary powers 
or allies. Generally, such interventions were very calamitous for Third World security, 
economic prosperity, social stability and positive historical progress. While intervention 
was one of the components of the Cold War, it is not plausible to accept that the Third 
World was a void to be dispensed with at will by superpowers. This work will 
demonstrate to the contrary that there were interactions so that superpowers and Third 
World nations engaged in conversations that centered on self-interest and aspirations. 
lnteractionism 
Melvyn Leffler and David Painter, Jason Parker, and Mathew Connelly among 
others took a different view to the nature of the Cold War in the global south. This 
approach, labeled here as the interactionist school, saw the Third World as a place where 
interactions occurred between the superpowers and the nations in this region. They 
believed that nations of the Third World exhibited a great sense of political agency. 
Interactionists again think that such agency was guided by practical national self-interest 
to achieve the second aim of Third World nationalism which is national development. 49 
The assumptions of the interactionist school provide the historiographical basis for this 
49Immanuel J. W Immanuel J. Wallerstein, "The Cold War and the Third World: The 
Good Old Days" (Binghampton, New York: Femand Braudel Center for the Study of 
Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations, 1990). He notes that Third World 
nationalism started in the 1920s with two aims: self-determination and national 
development. The first goal was achieved in the 1950s and 1960s. The second goal is yet 
to be achieved. 
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research. I set out to study how the Cold War interactions between Ghana, on one hand, 
and the United States, on another hand, supply an example of Third World political 
choices in external affairs that subsequently had domestic policy implications. 
Melvyn Leffler and David Painter held that leaders in the Third World 
manipulated the Cold War to improve the economy and security of their people. 50 The 
Cold War was not about the West and the Soviet Union having their way in the periphery. 
Rather, it represented a global interaction of economic, social, political, and cultural 
proportions in which "classes, factions, ethnic groups, and revolutionary nationalist 
movements in other countries used the Cold War to further their own interests and 
manipulate the great powers."51 This calls for studying those years within a transnational 
and internationalized historical framework. Leffler and Painter's view resonated with 
other scholars in the post-Cold War era. 
In Robert McMahon's edited book, The Cold War in the Third World, the global 
south's demonstrated agency in the East-West confrontation emerged as key in shaping 
global affairs. 52 While acknowledging the fact that Third World nations had to choose 
between one of two evils, the East or West, McMahon's book reasons that leaders in the 
periphery had their own national motives, desires and aspirations. To achieve these, they 
sought to expend superpowers' resources and goodwill in achieving these national goals. 
The global south therefore had a role in determining the direction, girth and depth of 
superpower involvement and interaction with them. They were not unconscionable 
50Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International 
History (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
51 Leffler and Painter, 1-2. 
52McMahon, The Cold War in the Third World. 
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puppets and clients. Rather, their every engagement with the East and West was 
constructed for greater benefits of their people. African leaders viewed the "use of non-
alignment not as a passive neutrality, but as an assertive and proactive strategy of 
exploiting international tensions"53 Nations in the periphery became active not passive 
actors in the East-West confrontation. The Third World therefore helped in determining 
the destinies of their respective nations through their engagement with superpowers and 
other great powers. 
Even more significant in the realization of this process of dialogue was the 
availability of new media technologies from the 1950s onwards. Jason Parker examined 
this arguing that the Cold War interaction was a multipolar dialogue involving many 
nations rather than a bipolar confrontation. 54 Public diplomacy efforts extended so that 
the struggle for political hegemony between America and the Soviets became a struggle 
for the hearts and minds of the people of the global south. American efforts here were led 
by the United States Information Agency. It carried out public diplomacy campaigns in 
nations in the global south to boost American image among the general population. 
However, it turned out that Third World leaders used the same media technologies to 
foster conversations and responses to the global debate over ideology, politics and 
development. In consequence, leaders in the Third World responded by launching their 
own campaigns in public diplomacy to influence and engender "the interactive 
process."55 Parker also stresses the fact that Soviet and American public diplomacy 
rivalry unwittingly created a non-European geopolitical faction that sought to use the 
53McMahon, 105. 
54Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices. 
55 Parker, 5. 
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same technological advantages to set and inform the pace and nature of global 
conversation during the Cold War. The non-alignment movement, the geopolitical child 
of East-West public diplomacy struggles, took center stage in global affairs in those 
decades. African leaders, for instance, put such diplomacy into limiting "competing 
American and Soviet claims" and ''to open channels of aid and alliance" from the 
superpowers.56 Jason Parker thus brought attention to the culture, media and 
communication's impact and centrality in casting Third World agency during the Cold 
War. 
More recently, Mathew Connelly carried further this idea of the global south's 
active participation in the Soviet-American rivalry. 57 Using the Algerian civil war, 
Connelly analyzed the internationalized nature of the Algerian revolution. The Algerian 
nationalists used the force of international opinion and diplomacy to counter the weight 
of French military occupation of their land. The nationalists couched the revolution as a 
"war ... to restore Algeria's existence as an independent nation."58 Their determination led 
to external support for their effort from Russia, China and the Third World. The western 
states mainly backed France though the U.S. was never as committed as France wished to 
the Algerian war efforts. The Algerian struggle was therefore, in a sense, a racial and 
cultural struggle. But the ability of the Algerian nationalist to marshaf the force of 
international opinion and foreign economic aid against the French, and the victory they 
attained all proved that periphery people were central actors in the Cold War. The 
confrontation between East and West was therefore not a wholly European or Soviet and 
56 Parker, 2. 
57 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution. 
58 Connelly, 7. 
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American affair, but a cross-national phenomenon. Connelly as well posits the Cold War 
as part of an on-going struggle between the north and south, for over a century starting 
with colonialism, for global dominance and control. Connelly goes as far as contending 
that the epicenter of the struggle was the Third World. So the periphery was not an 
afterthought in East-West contentions. It was a major ground of struggle and its people 
and leadership were not passive receptors of superpower stimuli. Rather, they acted and 
reacted to external powers in ways that assured their security and political independence. 
Recent historiography on Third World agency reveals growing flexibility, 
expansion and accommodation in the superpowers' Cold War strategic thinking towards 
the Third World. Leaders in the global south made foreign policy decisions that forced 
political and strategic reorientation towards them in Washington and Moscow. Even if 
they did not gain all the expected outcomes from their policy choices and reactions, they 
confirmed that they were far from puppets for the fulfillment of the North's interest 
against their will or their people. Ultimately, the currents of world divisions compelled 
them to one of two choices: act or stay put and be overshadowed. The consensus among 
scholars such as Connelly, Parker, Leffler and Painter, and McMahon is that Third World 
leaders acted for their own interest even if it was against the superpowers in an age of 
paranoid divisions. 
4. Organization of the Study 
In the introductory chapter, I set forth the background to this study, research focus 
and strategy as well as the historiographical basis for this work. These give the 
background information and analytical grounding of this study. 
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Chapter two discusses the person of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's quest for 
industrialization, and the self-serving foreign policy designs of the new Ghanaian state. I 
then interrogate the U.S. foreign policy towards Ghana during Nkrumah's administration 
as well as Washington's relations to Africa up to the 1960s. This chapter reveals the 
willfulness of intent, the global branding initiatives, and the calculated self-interest that 
shaped the foreign policy of Ghana under Nkrumah. 
Chapter three addresses the political and economic relations between Ghana and 
the United States with a focus on global level politics precisely at the United Nations 
from 1957 to 1966. I look at how Ghana used her interaction with the United States to 
appropriate relevant economic subsidies. Then I explain how this carried within it a sense 
of agency rather than subservience in U.S.-Ghana relations. 
In chapter four, I make a concluding discussion of the arguments made in this 
thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
Setting Goals: Origins of U.S. and Ghanaian Foreign Policies 
In this chapter, I set out to provide background information on Kwame Nkrumah and the 
broad domestic ambitions of the new Ghanaian nation. Then, I discuss Ghanaian foreign 
policy and its image enhancing goals. Next, the United States' aims in Ghana are 
examined as are the nation's policy towards Africa up to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
presidency in the 1960s. These would reveal patterns of relations, interaction, and 
cooperation. 
Kwame Nkrumah: The Man Behind Policy 
K wame Nkrumah was born on September 21, 1909 in the western coastal territories of 
the Gold Coast. He attended Government Teacher Training College in Accra from 1926 
to 1930. After graduating, he taught for some years. In 1935, he left the Gold Coast to 
enroll in Lincoln University in the United States. His time at Lincoln University was 
spent studying economics, sociology, and theology. He earned a bachelor's degree in 
economics and sociology and a Master of Arts degree in philosophy from Lincoln 
University and the University of Pennsylvania, respectively. He worked various jobs 
while in school and suggested that this poverty did not help his studies: "Life would have 
been so much easier if I could have devoted all my time to study. As things were, 
however, I was always in need of money and had to work out ways and means of earning 
my livelihood. "59 
Aside from colonialism and Catholicism, the early influences on Nkrumah's life 
59 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons Limited, 1959), 35. 
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were his time in the United States. During those critical years there and later in the United 
Kingdom, Nkrumah came into contact with different individuals and networks. He noted 
later that: "Apart from all my academic work and the various activities that I have 
mentioned, I made time to acquaint myself with as many political organizations in the 
United States as I could. These included Republicans, the Democrats, the Communists 
and the Trotskyites."60 But it was his association with socialists and anti-nationalists 
which deeply influenced his ideology and world view. This was so extensive and 
crystallized that in 1945 he published his first major work, Towards Colonial Freedom, a 
piece that laid set out his ideology and opinions about colonialism and the imperial 
enterprise. 
Those ideas and opinions remained fundamentally unchanged throughout his life. 
He reaffirmed them in another edition of the book in 1962 saying: "this booklet is exactly 
as it was written originally, that is, twenty years ago ... the views I expressed then are 
precisely the views I hold today concerning colonialism."61 He was sharply critical of 
colonialism and held that it was economically disadvantageous to the colonized people. 
In a more indirect way, Nkrumah's experience of Jim Crow in the U.S. did a lot to shape 
his world view about the West and its treatment of black Africans. These views fashioned 
the way he constructed his reactions to colonialism and the future he proposed for 
independent Africa; a shift from colonial dependence to economic self-reliance. Attaining 
that self reliance implied a newly independent states modernizing and reforming their 
economies from agrarian to a manufacturing economies. It is this mindset that explains 
the industrial and modernizing initiatives of Nkrumah during his years as leader of 
60 Nkrumah, 32. 
61 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle against World 
Imperialism (London: Heinemann, 1962), x. 
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Ghana. 
Nkrumah, Modernization and Economic Self-reliance 
One of the key strands in Nkrumah's thinking was how a free Africa should 
respond to the economic aspirations of its people. Critical of western capitalists, 
Nkrumah saw the industrializing agriculture as a means to lifting a new African state 
from poverty to substantial wealth. 62 In his book Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of 
Imperialism, he cites, for instance, the fact that cocoa production in Nigeria in 1954/55 
under colonial rule was 89,000 tons which racked in £39.25 million. In 1965, production 
of cocoa hit 310,000 tons with earnings standing at £40 million. 63 Increasing production 
during independence did not translate into higher earnings because the new states did not 
add value to their raw produce. Situations such as those convinced Nkrumah that 
modernizing the new nation-states of Africa was the only way to better productivity and 
assure wealth for the populace. By modernization, Nkrumah emphasized 
industrialization. For instance, his ideas of the African personality stood in stark contrast 
to western culture. It was therefore the material, economic components of western life 
that Nkrumah sought to appropriate for economic change in Ghana. Industrialization 
therefore represented an attempt to appropriate the West's best without sacrificing the 
unique African personality, culture and worldview. In short, industrialization did not 
equate to acculturation. 
As the quality of life improved, Ghana's demand for manufactured goods 
62 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, 1965). 
63 Nkrumah, 10. 
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increased in both absolute and relative terms. 64 Nkrumah saw this as an opportunity to 
tum primary goods into finished products for this burgeoning market. Also, increased 
primary goods production after independence did not equal increase foreign exchange 
flow into independent African states, including Ghana. Setting up homegrown industries 
was therefore to prevent a situation where scarce foreign currency earnings would be 
used to import manufactured goods from the West. For these reasons, policy makers in 
Ghana focused on building small industries in areas where the Ghanaian economy had 
competitive advantage. Factories established included textile, shoes, meat, paper, glass, 
and sugar industrial plants. These were intended to add value to primary produce for 
export and the local market. By mid-1966, there were fifty-three (53) state industries, 
twenty-three (23) public boards, and twelve (12) public-private partnership industries.65 
To facilitate this industrial development, decisions makers in Accra knew that 
reliable energy was necessary to power industries and plants throughout the country. In 
the early 1950s, Ghanaian policy makers began seeking seek foreign investment for a 
Volta River project, a massive hydro-electric power project in south-eastern Ghana that 
would create the world's largest man-made lake for the production of electrical power. 
The Volta River project was closely tied to the building of the Terna Harbor and an 
aluminum smelting plant later operated by the Kaiser Corporation of the United States. 
The effort to build these interrelated projects stretched Ghana's foreign policy choices to 
the limits because Nkrumah believed that the Volta River Project would "produce the 
64See, Yaw Agyemang-Badu, "Attitudes of African Nations Towards American Aid: The 
Case of Ghana and Nigeria" (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1980). 
65 Peter Robson and D.A Lury, The Economies of Africa (London: Allen and Unwin, 
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electrical power for our great social, agricultural and industrialization programme. "66 He 
again held strongly that "an abundance of cheap electric power is the soundest base for 
the expansion of industry in a country such as ours .... My government is detennined to 
develop the hydroelectric potential of Ghana to its rnaximum."67 For these reasons, 
Nkrumah moderated his foreign policy position to attract U.S. support for the project. In 
fact, George Padmore, Nkrumah's advisor, told the United States to "construct the Volta 
River project in the Gold Coast" if it was concerned about communist infiltration in 
Africa.68 To indirectly promise neutrality and subtle leaning to the West for technology 
and industrialization such as the Volta River project revealed the calculating but 
desperate need of the new Ghanaian leadership. Ghana's lobby for economic aid for the 
project was made in awareness that U.S. suspicions of Russian presence in Africa gave 
the Ghanaian side a bargaining power. On the one hand, Ghana desired aid for the Volta 
project and on the other hand the United States wanted to use Ghana as a manifestation of 
its benevolent African policy. The two sides therefore had an interest to interact within a 
parity relational framework. 
From independence to the early 1960's, Ghana shifted its policy as close as 
possible to the West, largely due to this desire for U.S. aid for a project so dear to 
Nkrumah's heart that Ghanaians nicknamed it, "Nkrumah's Baby." Moderation and 
pragmatism guided the external policy choices of the government of Ghana from 1957 to 
1961. Nkrumah strove to stay clear from the larger ideological problems in the Cold War 
66 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London: Panaf, 1968), 77. 
67 Kwame Nkrumah, "The Volta River Project" (Kwame Nkrumah Info Bank, February 
21, 1961), http://www.nkrumahinfobank.org/article.php?id=413&c=46. A speech before 
the National Assembly in 1961. 
68 George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1971), 375-76. 
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so as not to incur the disaffection of Washington. Such moderation caused Democrats and 
other critics to question Eisenhower's disinterest in engaging with African states to win 
their goodwill and give the U.S. a step ahead of the East in strategy on the continent.69 
Such criticisms led Eisenhower to give some attention to Nkrumah and the Volta River 
project as an expression of U.S. foreign policy interest on the continent. Nkrumah 
remained calculating in his speeches both at home and on the international stage. 70 
Subtlety and restraint emerged in Nkrumah's personality in response to the convolution 
of external forces he had to work with. The Convention People's Party (CPP), Nkrumah's 
party, also worked to reined in the Ghanaian media, especially the radical left-wingers, to 
present a common front in both words and deeds towards the U.S. and the West. 
Economic need therefore moderated Ghana's policy actions in relation to the United 
States during the early Nkrumah years. 71 
Even when the Congo crisis broke out and threatened to derail U.S.-Ghana 
relations, the Volta River project provided the last bastion of consensus and 
understanding between Ghana and the U.S. In fact, so important was this project that it 
became the subject of debate among congressional members in Washington when the 
Nkrumah administration started pushing back at U.S. involvement in the Congo. Ghana's 
position on the issue of the Congo was palpably pro-African and anti-colonial. This 
69 Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the 
Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986): 453-73, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2151625; William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), 16. 
70 Stephanie Decker, "Corporate Political Activity in Less Developed Countries: The 
Volta River Project in Ghana, 1958-66," Business History 53, no. 7 (December 1, 2011): 
993-1017, https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2011.618223. 
71 Detailed discussion of Ghana's foreign policy choices on the international stage and it 
economic aid gains from the Untied States is provided in the next chapter. 
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pained the new president, John Kennedy because he found it difficult to "justify a 
decision to help Nkrumah in the light of the leftward and authoritarian course of his 
domestic politics."72 For the U.S., the generosity to finance and build the Volta River 
should had been reciprocated with absolute submission to U.S. interest and leadership in 
Africa. This explained the concern of Kennedy with Ghana's "unhelpful positions on 
international issues."73 Ghana thought otherwise. Economic aid for the Volta project did 
not take away Ghana's agency in foreign policy on the continent because Africa was the 
central focus of Ghanaian foreign policy. Rather than answer to Washington, Nkrumah 
and his advisors looked to a resolution of the conflict so as to further the interest of the 
Congolese people but not the Belgian occupiers. More importantly, Nkrumah's stance on 
the Congo provided enhanced his standing as Africa's leading spokesperson. Such 
embellishment of his image gave Nkrumah voice and authenticity to then project his own 
nation's domestic concerns in an effort to gain external developmental help. 
During the early months of the Congo debacle, it took the intervention of 
corporate diplomats namely Edgar Kaiser and Chad Calhoun to help keep Nkrumah tied 
to the West without necessarily gaining his support for U.S. position in the Congo. 74 But 
Nkrumah saw the wooing from the corporate diplomats as opportunity to access 
Washington without passing through the U.S. embassy in Accra which he distrusted. 
James B. Engles, a U.S. embassy staff in Ghana, said Chad Calhoun was a kind of second 
72 McGeorge Bundy, "National Security Council Meetings," 1961, National Security 
Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series (No. 494), John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, 
MA. Hereafter, JFK Library. 
73 Bundy. 
74 Richard D. Mahonney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983). 
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ambassador with access to the corridors of power in Accra and Washington. 75 He saw 
Calhoun as a pawn in Nkrumah's hands because Calhoun was his "advocate" and 
"emissary." This made embassy information less irnpactful on the decisions made in the 
White House on Ghana. Jacob Gillespie, a U.S. Information Officer in Accra in the 
1960s, in speaking about the vertiginous nature of Ghana's policy, alleged: "And 
Nkrumah was a chameleon. I mean, he could change. He was very happy to be decent to 
us because with a large amount of AID (U.S. Agency for International Development) 
money and with Kaiser Industries he was building a major darn and increasing aluminum 
production."76 Nkrumah was therefore shrewd in his use of other vehicles of access to the 
White House to proceed with his dialogue with Washington for industrial knowledge 
transfer. He also appeared kaleidoscopic when engaging Washington officials due largely 
to the complex Cold War environment he operated in. Engles' concern seemed to have 
some truth when Calhoun's reports of Nkrumah to Kennedy are examined. For instance, 
he reported to Kennedy that: "Nkrumah still has his feet on the ground and knows where 
he is going. He is for Ghana, Africa, and particularly African unity, but not the 
communist route ... He is opposed to imperialism and colonialism in any guise, whether it 
be East or West. "77 Ghana could not have found a better advocate in the White House 
than Calhoun. Though the U.S. used 'corporate diplomacy' to successfully steer Ghana 
away from overt eastern influence, Nkrumah used that same vehicle to better his sway in 
negotiations in Washington. 78 He did this while maintaining, in reaction to subversive 
75 "Country and Subject Readers Series: Ghana" (Association of Diplomatic Studies and 
Training), 21, Arlington, VA, accessed November 18, 2017, www.adst.org. 
76 "Country and Subject Readers Series: Ghana," 27. 
77 Chad Calhoun, "National Security File Letter" (J.F.K Library, August 14, 1961). 
78 Decker, "Corporate Political Activity in Less Developed Countries." 
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activities by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that no "Government in a developing 
State, however weak its economic position, can accept this situation without demur."79 
Through this effective balancing of forces and use of good advocacy, Ghana got the U.S. 
president to concede to signing the final agreement on the Volta River project.80 The U.S. 
concern with communism and its spread therefore provided opportunity for Nkrumah to 
play his cards well to gain a major energy project for his countrymen. 
External policy was also deployed to push Ghana's economic agenda in relation to 
commodity prices on the world stage. To this end, Nkrumah thought about the need to 
"using international organizations and other media to exert pressure in our favour" with 
respect to commodity prices. 81 This was achieved through cooperation with co-producers 
of the same products to fix commodity prices and negotiate on prices with global 
consumers or purchasers. Informal alliances and agreements with co-producers of 
primary products made this economic diplomacy possible. Nkrumah realized that "a 
satisfactory price level can be held only by agreement with the other large producers, 
such as Brazil, Nigeria and others. With judicious use of our joint bargaining power, we 
may continue to use our exports of primary products to assist our industrialization. "82 So 
every resource available was invariably used to achieve this aim of industrialization in 
Ghana. The administration also worked to diversify the economy so as to provide a wide 
basis for Ghanaian capacity to earn more from a diverse portfolio of economic resources 
79 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana, March 17, 1964, 
FRUS 1964-1968, Volume 24, Africa, 1964, Ed. Nina Davis Howland, (Washington, DC, 
1999), Document Number 246. 
80 John F. Kennedy, "Kennedy to Nkrumah," December 14, 1961, RG 17/1/317, Ghana 
Public Record and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD). 
81 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963): 
110. 
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on the world commodity market. 
Additionally, knowledge transfer was at the core of the modernizing experience for 
the Ghanaian leadership. Nkrumah noted, about the Volta River project and Terna 
Harbour, that they: 
will provide opportunities for our people to develop skills at all levels. An 
essential element in our industrial development must be the building up of 
our store of technical and managerial knowledge. We are encouraging 
foreign investment, but to accept it merely for the purpose of widening our 
industrial base without strengthening our own skills and techniques will 
leave us as economically impoverished as we were under colonialism. 83 
Blind industrialization was abhorred. Only those that supported Ghanaian capacity to tap 
into and gain materially and technically from the industrial enterprise were encouraged. 
Ghana thus couched its industrial progress to imply expansion of domestic Ghanaian 
technical expertise. 
Nkrumah and Ghana's Self-interested Foreign Policy 
After independence, Ghana crafted its external policy towards three broad aims: total 
liberation of Africa, the promotion of non-alignment, and for economic development. 
These three objectives may appear altruistic. But looked at in a larger picture, the goals 
offered opportunity to put Ghana on the world stage far more conspicuously than the 
nation's size and resources allowed. The first two goals fed directly into Ghana's third 
foreign policy aim of economic development because they facilitated the emergence of an 
83 Nkrumah, 111. 
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international image which made it possible for Ghanaian leaders to undertake effective 
economic diplomacy. 
To give action to intents, Ghana called the first All African People's Conference 
m 1958, one year after regaining independence, to plan on strategies for self-
determination in the remaining colonies in Africa. Nkrumah outlined major concerns for 
the African nationalists cause namely "the speedy achievement of independence by 
colonial territories in Africa" and "the speediest economic and social reconstruction."84 In 
a more subtle way, the conference focused global attention on Ghana as the leading voice 
on African affairs. In fact, other conference attendees wanted assurances that Ghana "was 
not seeking leadership of Africa."85 Nkrumah took pains to explain that ''the only 
distinctive role which Ghana played was to act as host to the delegates."86 He recognized 
the opportunity such a conference opened for the image of Ghana but did not want to 
alienate others by overtly highlighting Ghana's "distinctive role."87 The pan-African 
activism of the Ghanaian state therefore gave it an embellished image on the global scene 
which raised concerns sometimes in Africa that Nkrumah and Ghana sought some kind of 
expanded leadership in Africa. 
The Ghanaian administration also supplied much needed capital and asylum to 
political fugitives engaged in freedom fighting. Using the U .N. and the Commonwealth 
84Kwame Nkrumah, "Speech by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening Session of 
the All-African People's Conference," December 8, 1958. 
85 Willard Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy Ideology, 
and the New State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 35. 
86 K wame Nkrumah, "Speech by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening Session of 
the All-African People's Conference" (History Department, Columbia University, 
December 8, 1958), http://www.columbia.edu/itc/history/mann/w3005/nkrumba.htm1. 
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as avenues for expressing African concerns, Ghanaian diplomats made it a point to speak 
about colonial injustices that plagued the continent mainly in Portuguese controlled 
African territories, Rhodesia, and South Africa. In fact, Ghana initiated a boycott of all 
South African goods, services, airlines and shipping in 1960 in a widely publicized 
critique of the apartheid regime. About South Africa, Nkrumah thought that "its policy of 
apartheid and its continual blatant repression and suppression of the vast majority of 
Africans in South Africa are contrary to the multi-racial character of the 
Commonwealth."88 At the U.N., Ghana showed through its votes on colonial questions 
that its sympathies lay with oppressed peoples. The foreign policy aim was therefore to 
help do away with the vestige of colonial rule on African soil. These efforts at anti-
colonial activism however, provided greater preponderance to Ghana's image as the 
leading voice in Africa. That imaging gave the new Ghanaian state political currency that 
many other states did not have at this in Africa. 
Ghana made it clear in the Republic Constitution (1960) that it was the center for 
an eventual union of the continent. Embedded in this was a sense of Ghana's readiness to 
sacrifice its sovereignty for the greater good of the continent. In the long term however, 
this bold step cemented Ghana's image as an African power and voice. This gave the 
nation greater legitimacy as a center for African freedom fighting since, in the words of 
Nkrumah, "Ghana has been a spearhead of African political advance."89 The 
constitutional provision also helped further a certain moral leadership for the nation in 
Africa based on this presumed readiness to make sacrifice of its sovereignty for the 
88L. Winston Cone, "Ghana's African and World Relations," India Quarterly 17, no. 3 
(July 1, 1961): 258-76, https://doi.org/10.l 177/097492846101700304. 
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purpose of continental unity. Brief flirtations with Guinea and Mali for a union and a 
strong alliance in the Casablanca bloc with Morocco, Egypt, Libya and others for an 
accelerated African union all made the constitutional provision of 1960 even more 
meaningful in positioning Ghana positively in pan-African circless.90 
Non-alignment was another strand in Nkrumah's foreign policy. Nkrumah viewed 
non-alignment as staying aloof all superpower rivalry because "we want to be friends to 
all and enemies to none."91 He recognized that "when we in Africa survey the industrial 
and military power concentrated behind the two great powers in the Cold war we know 
that no military or strategic act of ours could make one jot of difference to this balance of 
power."92 However, he refused to associate non-alignment with complete disavowal of 
periphery states voice in global politics and concerns. Non-alignment implied that Ghana 
would be "aligned with all the forces in the world that genuinely make for peace."93 So 
the idea was not to stay totally unconcerned about the moral, humanitarian, and economic 
problems of the world. Rather, periphery states such as Ghana genuinely sought an 
expression of their thoughts and solutions to the existential ills of the world community. 
This policy of neutrality enhanced periphery states' legitimacy and integrity not only to 
speak moralistically, but to boldly request help from richer powers. This was the case 
with Ghana. 
90 Nkrumah. Nkrumah spoke about this need for African unity in both this book and in 
speeches across the world. This idea of African unity was so deeply ingrained in 
Nkrumah's thoughts that it shaped his disdain of regional cooperation and organizations 
in Africa since these hampered the larger goal of full scale African integration. See, 
Arhin, The Life and Works of Kwame Nkrumah, chap. xii. 
91Kwame Nkrumah, "The Republic of Ghana Is Born" (Kwame Nkrumah Info Bank, July 
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https://doi.org/10.2307 /20029330. 
93 Nkrumah. 
44 
One crowning achievement which endorsed Ghana's non-align credentials was 
the June 1962 World Without Bomb Conference which discussed a world safe from the 
risk of atomic warfare. The conference convinced many in the U.N. to vote Ghana to the 
Security Council for two years. 94 Non-alignment was therefore not just a policy towards 
superpowers but a means to gain global trust and positive reception, important political 
capital for advancing the nation's brand and good. In this kind of diplomacy, Nkrumah 
appeared to be very able. 
In his famous 1958 address at the Council for Foreign Relations in Washington, 
which has already been cited here, Nkrumah pressed forward with his neutralist position 
on global politics giving deep insights into the problems of Africa and the world in a way 
few could effectively articulate. He held strongly that non-aligned nations had a 
responsibility to shape global discussions "in season and out of season to substitute the 
peaceful settlement of disputes."95 The excellent articulation put his name forward as the 
leading spokesperson for Africa. In fact, he so impressed that the New York Times 
thought him a possible voice of reason to tame the unrestrained nationalism emerging 
from Africa. 96 That image gave Nkrumah and Ghana the publicity and attention in 
Washington which advanced the Ghanaian development cause. For instance, Miles S. 
Pendleton Jnr., a U.S. volunteer who served in Accra, acknowledged that "Ghana ... had 
captured my imagination much more than Nigeria and Sierra" in his decision to serve in 
94 Kwame Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah's Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies: 
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Africa.97 His conviction, to a large extent, came from Ghanaian politicians' ability to 
project Ghana as the face of freedom and political civility on the continent. 
Through non-alignment, Nkrumah and other leaders of the global south desired to 
shift the global balance of power to peace. That peace gave developing states the space 
and pace to grow out of poverty, illiteracy and general underdevelopment. No place was 
more amiable to the preaching and conducting non-align politics than the U.N. and the 
Commonwealth. Affirming his faith in the U.N., Nkrumah wrote that "the existence of 
the United Nations Organization offers a guarantee for the independence and territorial 
integrity of all states, whether big or small."98 In order for the U.N to live up to this 
expectation, it was important that small nations actively participate to limit the ominous 
influence of the great powers so as to preserve their freedom, independence of action, and 
security. General Assembly voting records at the U.N. show independence of choice by 
Ghana which underscored the non-alignment Nkrumah professed. But even this claim to 
neutrality had its intended material and psychological outcomes for Ghana. Nkrumah's 
attempts at refereeing conflicts such as in Vietnam and Congo, under U.N. leadership, 
were aimed at furthering and consolidating the international image he was creating for 
Ghana. Evans Gordon, a program officer of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), commenting on Ghana's role in Vietnam affirmed that Nkrumah 
"felt that if he could bring about an end to this senseless conflict, in his opinion, he would 
again win the good graces of the West, most especially the United States."99 For 
Nkrumah, every foreign policy, even didactic ones such as neutrality, could inure 
97 "Country and Subject Readers Series: Ghana," 34. 
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materially to one's benefit when carefully executed through global bodies such as the 
U .N. or the Commonwealth. 
Also, through the U.N., politicians from Accra remonstrated the gagging of anti-
colonial activists and other neo-colonialist manifestations in global south economics and 
politics.100 While such advocacy helped nationalist groups around the Third World, 
Ghanaian leadership in this political sphere made it possible to position the Ghanaian 
state as one of the lone voices in the Third World for freedom. This anti-colonialism 
helped Ghanaian leaders curry favor with emerging states as well as gain traction for 
Ghana as a leader in the Third World in the eyes of powerful states in the global north. 
Publicity and exposure of this nature enhanced Ghanaian foreign policy experts' weight 
in their movements in policy circles in New York, Washington, and other centers of 
power. The fact that Ghana sent some of its best brains to the U.N. made clear its regard 
for the work of the U.N., its potential to shape a new world, and the prospect of Ghana to 
use it for global branding purposes. Perhaps, some of the ablest of such men were Daniel 
Chapman and Alex Quaison-Sackey, who became the president of the General Assembly 
in 1964. There was therefore a mix bag of self interest and genuine global good in 
Ghana's non-alignment policy. 
The Commonwealth was another place for Ghana's non-aligned, anti-colonial and 
economic diplomacy. The Commonwealth aimed to use the common English-speaking 
100 Ghanaian votes in the General Assembly show that anti-colonial activism was one 
area Ghanaian delegations were most successful at. The U .N. gave a more prominent 
avenue for Ghana to effectively show solidarity with Third World forces while equally 
showing restraint on issues touching on relations with the West and East. It was the case 
of attaining balance among three centers of power and interests. See the next chapter for 
details on Ghana's U.N. voting records. 
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heritage of its members to promote social, economic, technical and educational 
cooperation amongst them.101 It was hoped that this would facilitate development and 
modernization in the emerging nations of the global south. Because Nkrumah desired 
economic autonomy for Ghana in the shortest possible time, he used the Commonwealth 
platform to advocate for fairer cocoa prices on the world market given that Ghana 
produced about a quarter of global output in the 1960s. In fact, so vigorous was Nkrumah 
in pursuing this aim that he staunchly opposed the United Kingdom's bid to join the 
European Economic Community (ECC). 102 Letters and representations were made to the 
French President Charles De Gaulle to frustrate the U.K. desire to enter the ECC. The 
audacity of Nkrumah in opposing the U.K's entry into the E.C.C. for expressly Ghanaian 
economic interests proved the shrewdness and courage of the administration in Accra. 
There was no sense of subservience to the U.K. but rather a sense of urgency and 
responsibility to advocate the preservation of the U.K. market for Ghanaian producers. 
The Commonwealth was therefore an instrument, in the mind of Nkrumah, to forge not 
only English-speaking solidarity with other states but to press for Ghana's economic 
interest on the global stage. 
However, the economic interest of Ghana in the Commonwealth did not diminish 
its genuine commitment to using the platform for anti-colonial activities. As a multiracial 
organization, the Commonwealth offered a new approach to global politics distinct from 
101 "Charter of the Commonwealth" (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012). 
102 Lindsay Aqui, "Macmillan, Nkrumah and the 1961 Application for European 
Economic Community Membership," The International History Review 39, no. 4 (August 
8, 2017): 575-91, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1245675. Nkrumah saw UK's 
membership in the EEC as a threat to the export interest of Ghana. The UK could tum to 
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the rather racialized regional blocks like the European Union, the Organization of African 
Unity, or the even military pacts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
Warsaw Pact nations. Nkrumah believed that the Commonwealth offered "the most 
effective methods by which colonialism can be ended without revolutions or violence and 
under conditions in which the former colonial territory still retain a close and friendly 
association with the former imperial power."103 Ghana's interest here was to call for 
support for the forces of freedom and emancipation. Due to the shared values of 
Commonwealth nations and its multiracial nature, Ghana saw the body as specially 
positioned to act for and stand with people still under colonial rule. Also important was 
neocolonialism. Nkrumah worryingly observed that: "it is disturbing to see so many 
countries of varying sizes and at different levels of development, weak and, in some 
cases, almost helpless. If this terrible state of fragmentation is allowed to continue it may 
well be disastrous for us all."104 This problem of economic incapacity in the midst of 
political freedom for many new African countries made them insecure and eventually 
heavily dependent on ex-colonial powers. They hoisted new flags but continued to take 
commands from ex-colonial powers. That kind of dependency threatened political 
independence of the nations of the continent and this bothered Third World states such as 
Ghana. Through the Commonwealth, Ghana championed technology transfer to boost the 
capacity of newly independent states to improve the condition of life of their people. 
Eventually, technology and knowledge transfer from such states as Canada, Australia and 
the U.K. went to many new Commonwealth nations. In fact, Canadian politicians 
employed these transfers for effective diplomacy by using "military assistance to build 
103Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Jdealogy, IO 1. 
104 Nkrumah .. 
, Xll. 
49 
personal relationships with new Commonwealth leaders". 105 For Ghana, its political 
neutralist stance paid off in this area of knowledge transfer. For instance, an Ottawa 
Defense document reported that "Canada has sent a full training team to Ghana, a 
neighbouring but smaller Commonwealth country, whose government follows a neutralist 
and occasionally anti-Western foreign policy". 106 Accra's neutralism and non-alignment 
was therefore not only altruistic but highly beneficial to the new Ghanaian leaders who 
desired to conquer modernity for their people. 
The foreign policy of Nkrumah was therefore well constructed to serve needs at 
home and promote the interest of friends and neighbors abroad. The external image of the 
new nation did not emerge out of a vacuum. Rather, it came out of a careful process of 
choice making in which economics played a much a role as politics did. The construction 
of Ghana's external image was made to serve the larger needs of domestic economic 
growth and national self-reliance.107 The practical methods and outcome of this process of 
using foreign policy to achieve domestic policy aims would be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The United States Objectives in Nkrumah's Ghana 
Before examining U.S. aims in Ghana, it is important to understand the attitudes 
that defined the way Washington cultivated relations with new African states such as 
Ghana. The politics of race in the U.S. during the years before the Civil Rights 
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Movement influenced official thinking so that Secretary of State George McGhee, in 
dismissing African nationalists, stated that "The United States Government has always 
maintained that premature independence for primitive, uneducated people can do them 
more harm than good."108 Such racially loaded views shaped the way the U.S. politicians 
perceived Africa, Africans and African governments in the crucial years of nationalism 
and new state-building in Africa. Thomas Borstelmann asserts, concerning the Truman 
years, that: "The elite white men who ran both the State and Defense Departments and 
the intelligence agencies were comfortable with the world they had grown up and 
succeeded in, a world marked by European power, Third World weakness, and nearly 
ubiquitous racial segregation."109 These policy makers with fractured views on race and 
culture carried over their racial views into policy making with regards to Africa and 
Ghana in particular. The attitude towards Ghana in Washington policy circless in the 
early years of self-autonomy was therefore subtly defined by this racial bias. At least one 
Ghanaian diplomat on official business in the U.S. suffered Jim Crow discrimination and 
this accentuated Ghanaian and African conviction that racialism informed the U.S. 
treatment of African governments. 110 
108 Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Robert Dallek, and Walter LaFeber, The Dynamics of 
World Power:: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, vol. 
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refused a seat after requesting orange juice in a Delaware hotel. The incident highlighted 
the social and ethical problems in U.S. society which made it easy for Cold War 
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out a breakfast invitation to him to the White House. 
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John Foster Dulles predicted in 1955 that "the scene of the battle between the free 
world and the Communist world was shifting" following the rise of official non-
alignment starting in particular with the conference at Bandung, Indonesia that year. One 
of the nation which best represented that change was Ghana. U.S. aims in Ghana were 
defined by what Shepard termed its "vital interests" and those interests were manifold. 
While those "vital interests" were fluid to define, they shaped U.S. policy towards Ghana, 
nonetheless. 111 As early as 1954, the Eisenhower administration was concerned about 
anti-colonial nationalist movements in Africa in the belief that they were pro-Communist. 
In fact, Eisenhower and his administrators were less hopeful about African nations 
getting independence than they were about social interventions in the colonies. 112 This 
lack of confidence explained the disinterest of Washington in Africa despite the 
rumblings of pro-nationalist movements. John Kennedy and congressional Democrats 
criticized the Eisenhower administration as planning to lose Africa to the Communists. 113 
The condemnations helped motivate Eisenhower to seek to build a relationship with 
Ghana that would demonstrate his concern for the continent. It was in this spirit that U.S.-
Ghanaian relations were forged during the late 1950s. 
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Nkrumah was a source of concern for the U.S. early on in his career. Washington 
looked on suspiciously in 1952 when Nkrumah threw open salvos against the colonial 
enterprise.114 So an early U.S. aim in Ghana was to undermine any pro-Eastern forces in 
the politics of the nation or a movement eastward of any prevailing political movement. 
The Eisenhower administration hoped that in the Gold Coast, "the nationalist movement 
be directed into constructive rather than destructive channels."115 Those destructive ends 
implied any play into the gallery of Communism. Ghana's relevance was amplified by 
the strategic relevance Accra played in Allied war efforts in 1945. It had been a 
connecting point for Allied flights making it over to the Middle East and Asia. 
By keeping a future independent nation under Nkrumah free from Communist 
influence, Washington expected that "should world-wide hostilities erupt again, Gold 
Coast bases probably will once more become of strategic importance to the United 
States."116 East and West competition led to weighing strategy over other concerns in 
constructing policy responses by both sides. In fact, it is not out of place to suggest that 
expectations of another worldwide bloodshed between East and West moderated colonial 
authorities' propensity to grant autonomy to many African territories. It was logical that 
colonial powers and their allies keenly monitored the political leanings of local 
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Slany, and Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC, 1983), Document 104. 
115Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South 
Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State for Administration 
(Lourie), June 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume 11, Part 1, Africa And South Asia, 
1953, Eds. Joan M. Lee, David W. Mabon, Nina J. Noring, Carl N. Raether, William F. 
Sanford, Stanley Shaloff, William Z. Slany, and Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC, 1983), 
Document 118. 
116Ibid. 
53 
nationalist forces. This explains why U.S. official took interest in the politics of 
nationalism in the Gold Coast for signs of Communist infiltration in its political 
organizations. For this reason, counteroffensive measures by Nkrumah against suspected 
Communists in his party members were duly noted and reported back to the State 
Department with glee. 117 
Despite early signs of U.S. aims at limiting Eastern influence in Ghana, the new 
Ghanaian state made it clear that its foreign policy would neither face east nor west. 118 
The Ghanaian leadership sought rather to spearhead efforts at complete decolonization 
and meaningful economic development for its people and other African people. In order 
to fulfill such a grand vision, Nkrumah worked to align himself with likeminded leaders 
from the global south. He bought into the non-align vision of countries such as Indonesia, 
India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia. In fact, from independence, Ghana's United Nations voting 
followed closely that of India due to the latter's neutral policies.119 This policy of non-
alignment and positive neutrality would seem at first glance appealing. But the insistence 
of non-aligned states to have fruitful relations with all states irrespective of ideology was 
problematic in at many levels in U.S.-Ghana relations. 
In true neutral spirits, Ghana's pronouncements as well as those by other Third 
World leaders that questioned the United States and its allies' position, condemned 
western lapses in global policy, and raised problems with the United States' global 
117Report by the Vice Consul at Accra (Fleming), October 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
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leadership were interpreted in Washington as a combination of "the emotions and 
resources of the entire Middle East and Africa into a single onslaught against Western 
civilization."120 Even normal interactions between Russia and Ghana upset Washington 
due to fears "about increasing Russian and Chinese involvement in Africa." 121 
Washington construed its Cold War rivals' actions in a way that helped it design actions 
to limit the creeping influence of those rivals in spaces Washington deemed important. 
Some choices, when pursued to diminish the rival's advantage, could cause disaffection 
in periphery states and widen the gulf between the U.S. actors and some global south 
leaders including Nkrumah. One manifest case was the Congo impasse. It was probably 
the single most divisive issue between Washington and Accra so that Historians such as 
W. Scott Thompson have cited it as the defining point of divergence or divorce of Ghana 
from the western position advocated by the United States. 122 So the discourse over non-
alignment eventually led to the larger question of what political neutrality was and 
whether Ghana could remain neutral in the Cold War contentions. 
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As already explained, Washington policy makers expected Nkrumah's non-
alignment to mean anti-Communism and a complete disavowal of all things eastern. 
American officials took exception to Nkrumah's gesture of accepting Soviet, Chinese, 
and other Eastern gifts and expertise such as agricultural implements, some 2,000 Soviet 
technical advisors, and over 250 Chinese experts. 123 As explained earlier, Ghana defined 
non-alignment as a form of positive political neutrality and did not view such relations 
with the East as inherently evil or threatening to the interest of the Ghanaian state or its 
people. However, for the U.S. this amounted to connivance with the East. Washington 
officials preferred a much stricter interpretation of non-alignment which forbade relations 
with the East or the Soviet Union. Even when U.S. diplomats, such as U.S. Ambassador 
to Ghana, William P. Mahonney Jnr., understood the kind of foreign policy moderation 
the Ghanaian state was embarking on, Washington elites were not willing to listen to his 
counsel that: "in the field of foreign relations Nkrumah frequently serves the purposes of 
Mao and Khrushchev but that he was too much of an egotist ever willingly to be their 
pawn. In short, I said, his Marxist bark was worse than his bite and that I felt we must 
learn to live with him."124 But even here Mahonney misread some of Nkrumah's 
statements believing anti-colonial statements were actually pro-Communist utterances. 
There was always a misunderstanding of what entailed genuine anti-colonialism and 
actual communist leanings. This remained a point of disagreement for a long time. 
The widening chasm between Ghana and the United States deepened when 
Ghana's foreign policy of anti-colonialism and opposition to neo-imperialism in Africa 
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contradicted American understanding and aims on the continent, which amounted to 
propping up minority regimes and sustaining colonial control without appearing to do so 
publicly. The policy to not support genuine black African nationalism stemmed, as noted 
earlier, in the racialized lens through which foreign policy makers viewed Africa in the 
U.S. It was logical that Ghana's pro-African aims would clash with Washington's in 
Africa due the disagreements over the form and extent of the north's involvement in 
Africa. It appears that the U.S. wanted Ghana to be more concerned about communism 
than about the freedoms and independence of colonial spheres on the continent. In this 
way, Washington interpreted world politics in a way that subjugated the hopes of 
freedom of African nationalists to the need to resist and destroy communism. Such a 
position left Ghana unimpressed so that its leaders intensified their own campaign against 
colonial rule across the continent. 
There was therefore a difference in policy approaches between Ghana and the 
U.S. despite the similarity of their goals of working to end oppression and threats of 
oppression from colonialism and communism, respectively. Ghana's mission involved 
creating an Africa capable of global influence to chart a new path of peace and prosperity 
without the threats of bombs. The United States wanted a world led by itself where 
Russia and its socialist, communist ideology would be consigned to history. While Ghana 
and the United States were united in advocating peace, freedom and progress their 
understanding of how to achieve these objectives were divergent. Whereas U.S. policy 
makers desired to subordinate Ghanaian goals to the larger U.S. aims of hegemony in 
Africa, the Ghanaian administration saw it right and moral to stand with fellow African 
peoples still living under colonial rule. 
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To further the goal of co-opting Ghana into U.S. Africa policy, the American 
embassy in Accra employed effective public diplomacy programs such as radio and print 
media advocacy to help place the United States in a positive public light in the eyes of the 
Ghanaian people. An information center at the embassy provided education programs and 
materials for public consumption while the U.S. embassy officials also did not hesitate to 
use resources available to support official Ghanaian government activities when the need 
arose. For instance, the U.S. embassy information service helped the Ghanaian 
government with "mimeograph machines, paper, typewriters in order to conduct the 
meeting properly" for the first Organization of African Unity (O.A.U) meeting in Accra 
in 1958.125 
A more potent approach the U.S. employed to try to court Ghanaian support for 
its policy in Africa was economic vehicles from the late 1950s to early 1960s. Lyndon 
Johnson's special aide on military affairs, Howard Burris, captured this economic 
diplomacy succinctly when he stressed that: "U.S. policy continues to be the 
encouragement of private investment and technical assistance in Ghana for its further 
development and to counter Soviet activities in industry and in the country as a whole."126 
Economic aid was therefore a means to the larger end of diminishing Soviet influence in 
Africa. Despite these, Ghana's votes in the United Nations General Assembly on 
colonialism and colonial people during the Eisenhower years signified one of the key 
areas of non-concurrence by Ghana. So, it is important to realize that not even a capital 
intensive enterprises such as the Akosombo Dam, could gag Ghana's anti-colonial 
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efforts.127 The dam was financed through a combination of internal Ghanaian funding and 
private U.S. investments from the Kaiser Aluminum Corporation. The aim was to build a 
hydroelectric dam in southeastern Ghana that would be used to process aluminum for 
export to the U.S. market. The remaining power would then be used for other industrial 
purposes and for residential uses. Economic tools therefore had their limit in inducing 
policy agreement from Third World states such as Ghana. Certain foreign policy aims 
like anti-colonialism were almost non-negotiable for the Ghanaian state during those 
years of independence. 
While both Ghana and the United States were essentially speaking about freedom 
and the need to disseminate it, they failed to see the common aim that bound them. For 
the U.S., it was the geopolitical force of the Cold War that made it unable to perceive that 
supporting Ghana's anti-colonial stance in Africa implied building free societies who 
would be crucial against communism. Contrarily, any prop up of the colonial enterprise 
as the U.S. did in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia drove African nationalists into the 
communists' fold. By the 1960s, it was clear that a lack of understanding between the two 
nations deepened their differences. When the Congo crisis broke out, the real gap that had 
occurred now became visible to all. Congo's role in the deep division between Ghana and 
the United States is discussed in the next chapter. U.S. aims in independent Ghana 
therefore met complex responses from Ghanaian policy makers. Concerns with 
communist infiltration clouded the overall relations the U.S. developed towards Ghana. 
But there was a lack of grasp of how Ghanaian concerns with imperialism and, even, neo-
colonialism mirrored U.S. concerns with the oppressive threat of communism. 
127 This is discussed further in the next chapter. 
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Background to Washington's Africa Policy 
From very early in U.S. history, a myriad of people from across the world mixed 
together in its vast territory. Through British naval and trading activities, people of 
African origin were brought to the West Indies and then into the United States as 
enslaved plantation workers. The arrivals from Africa were not free migrants. They were 
enslaved. From the beginning, they played a significant role in the making of the modem 
United States. During the revolutionary wars, these Americans of African origin fought 
for both the patriots and the loyalists. 128 After gaining its freedom, the U.S. went out in 
search of diplomatic and economic relations with other nations. One of the early 
destinations was Africa where Morocco became one of the first nations to recognize U.S. 
sovereignty. In Africa, trade in crucial resources could propel U.S. industrial and 
economic growth including slaves. The commercial relationship with Africa was not new. 
It was only a continuation of commerce carried on by British businesses and colonizers 
who had brought goods and people from Africa to U.S. 
In the early twentieth century, U.S. trade volumes with Africa were paltry in 
comparison to other regions. While business contacts with the continent were maintained, 
only the U.S. export component seemed positive. For instance, between 1910 and 1918, 
U.S. exports to Nigeria were considerably higher than imports. Only in 1916 and 1917 
did imports exceed exports due probably to reduced imports from Europe during the First 
World War.129 By the outbreak of the war, there were advances in trade volumes between 
the continent and the United States. However, Washington's economic attentions did not 
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equal political interest in Africa before the war. Henry Serrano Villard captured it 
succinctly when he observed that: "With the exception of independent Liberia, for whom 
we acted as 'next friend and attorney,' we had no particular interest in what was to all 
intents and purposes an appendage of Europe and therefore a blind spot in our view of the 
international scene, where even American commerce were at a negligible low."130 
In 1945, U.S. victory in the war implied an expanded global role for Washington. 
But even those new roles did not necessarily imply more attention to Africa. During and 
immediately after the war, the U.S. treated Africa as an appendage of the imperial 
powers. African affairs were managed by the Division of European Affairs at the 
Department of State. But then, a rethinking of Washington's Africa policies began to take 
shape after the war. Strategic security concerns drew Washington's alertness to Africa's 
strategic importance in the war. Indeed, President Roosevelt noted in 1942 the need "to 
prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of northern or western Africa and to 
deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the 
Atlantic coast of the Americas. "131 
While those reconsiderations were going on in Washington, African nationalist 
movements also sprung up demanding immediate self-determination to facilitate their 
own national development. The U.S. responded to such political buoyancy with caution. 
President Roosevelt and his administration, for instance, doubted if subject people had 
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prepared themselves well enough for self-government.132 For this reason, the U.S. led in 
constructing structures and systems it believed would make the world safe and guarantee 
the attainment of human freedom and liberty in the long term. The trusteeship system of 
the United Nations was one such body mooted to steer new colonial people towards 
gradual self-government.133 To make good its intentions as a global power in Africa, the 
U.S. got into the business of aid allocation to African governments after 1945. Between 
1945 and 1955, the American government disbursed $71, 595, 000 of foreign aid to 
African dependencies and independent countries. This represented about 0.15% of total 
global aid packages the U.S. delivered worldwide. Though inadequate as a proportion of 
aid distributed globally, the aid given showed U.S. concern with the future of the region. 
Most other financial packages in the forms of loans in this period went to the white 
minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia. 134 There was an increase in 
actual trade volumes with Africa after 1945 but this increase remained statistically 
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insignificant compared with larger U.S. global economic engagements. For instance, in 
1954, American investments in Africa stood at $568 million.135 A year later in 1955, the 
United States' African imports constituted just 5.4% of total imports into the country. 136 
The United State therefore had few diplomatic or trade representatives in Africa. 
With decolonization taking shape in Africa in the 1950s, the U.S. shifted in its 
dependence and deference to the colonial powers over issues of African affairs. As six 
new African nations joined the United Nations by 1958, the U.S. grew in aware of the 
need to bring emerging nations in Africa into the West's orbit within the context of the 
increasing East-West rivalry. This change was marked by Vice President Richard 
Nixon's advocacy for a new unit for African affairs after his African tour. 137 But the goal 
of extending Western spheres of influence to Africa was complicated by U.S. allies who 
were in the imperial business in Africa. France fought protracted colonial wars against 
nationalists in its colonies in Vietnam and Algeria.138 While Britain was less inclined 
towards violence in settling colonial questions, but it did undertake violent resistance in 
Kenya. Belgium and Portugal, two smaller imperial nations, vigorously declined to grant 
self-autonomy to their colonies. In Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea, 
Portugal resisted nationalists militarily throughout the post-war era at high cost in human 
lives and capital. 139 
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Added to these was mounting Communist interest in and operations with 
nationalists in Africa. U.S. politicians' tacit support for colonial forces in Rhodesia, 
South Africa and in Portuguese controlled Africa appear to have been aimed at enabling 
those imperial powers resist the rise of pro-communist forces within the liberation 
movements in the colonies. The support also helped strengthen the Western military and 
economic pact best represented in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Washington craved for purpose in its relations with its European allies and at the same 
time desired greater political liberty for people of all cultures. As E.H Bourgerie, 
commenting on the Gold Coast, put it: 
Increasing awareness by the Gold Coast peoples .. .is one of our major 
problems and one which challenges our very best talent, provided we 
intend to keep these peoples on our side. Today, the free nations are 
working to imbue the world with democratic ideals, and so long as the 
United States supports this policy we cannot help but encourage the desire 
of peoples under political domination or control to fashion their own 
destiny. 140 
The new political awareness was, therefore, as much an African phenomenon as a Gold 
Coast experience. The existential threat of communism, however, compelled the U.S. to 
sacrifice the second goal of supporting the cause of freedom for the first aim of abetting 
European states' activities in Africa. So, strategic interests overrode the larger moral and 
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political impulses among actors in Washington against the self-determining ambitions of 
African nationalists and people. 
In 1953, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles genuinely acknowledged this 
ambiguity when he observed that: 
Most of the people of the near east and Southern Asia are deeply 
concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They 
are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect 
because, it is reasoned, our NATO alliances with France and Britain 
require us to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies. 
I am convinced that the United States policy has been unnecessarily 
ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully 
recognized that it would be a disaster if there were any break between the 
United States and Great Britain and France. However, without breaking 
from the framework of Western Unity, we can pursue our traditional 
dedication to political liberty. 141 
Dulles' words were descriptive of the limits of U.S. interests in and presence in Africa 
because as of 1952 the U.S. operated only three embassies in all of Africa. There was 
therefore no clear-cut policy towards Africa even as new countries were shaking off the 
shackles of colonialism. Interest in Africa generally fell to lobby groups and humanitarian 
141 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Africa, the United States and the Third World Economy: The 
Historic Bases of American Policy," In Frederick S. Arkhurst, United States Policy 
towards Africa (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 16; Ladipo 
Adamolekun, The Foreign Policy of Guinea, Foreign Policies of African States (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1977). 
65 
bodies who sometimes demonstrated considerable financial concern for Africa in contrast 
to the government's posture toward the continent. The lack of focus on Africa in 
Washington mirrored the bigger problem of race and social segregation in the United 
States as already noted by Borstelmann. 142 
When African states emerged from colonial rule, the U.S. began establishing 
diplomatic relations with new nations in the years after independence. The political and 
economic leverage inherent in such diplomatic arrangements were too promising to be 
ignored. For instance, more than fifty African states now casting votes at the U.N., 
Washington could count on new friends in its rivalry with the East. Nixon famously 
remarked that Africa would be "the decisive factor in the conflict between the forces of 
freedom and international communism."143 Establishing diplomatic relations marked the 
initial move in the attempt to gain African confidence for deeper engagement with the 
U.S. Through the new Bureau of African Affairs, the United States government worked 
to craft effective policy responses to African nations within Cold War frameworks. 
By the 1960s, the U.S. increasingly developed a new, engaged approach to the 
Third World under President John F. Kennedy who understood, long before he assumed 
the presidency, the nature of Third World nationalism and developmental concerns. 
African pursuance of non-alignment and neutrality provided opportunity for Kennedy to 
undertake direct or personal diplomacy to advance the U.S. yearning to counter Soviet 
influence and attaining goodwill for the U.S. abroad. Personal diplomacy was an 
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undertaking President Eisenhower did not fully understand or handle effectively but 
which President Kennedy embraced. 
For President Kennedy, personal diplomacy with Third World leaders meant 
creating warmer relations with non-aligned leaders in an effort to gain the Third World's 
trust. He believed the grounds for the future struggle with communism lay not in Europe 
"but rather in Asia, Latin America, and Africa."144 To this end, he vigorously pursued 
friendship with prominent leaders in the Third World such as Nkrumah, Nehru and Sekou 
Toure. In Kennedy's world, the force of moral diplomacy and soft power could do what 
traditional hard-line approaches could not do. As a senator, Kennedy detested the hard-
line policies of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who was vociferous in 
denouncing non-align supporters and Third World national leaders but proffered no direct 
policy action on courting those leaders for U.S. interests. 
Eisenhower and Dulles held faith in a thick line between the forces of good, 
freedom, democracy and progress, and the forces of unfreedom, communism, and 
retrogression. Due to this, Schlesinger viewed Dulles' legacy as one that "succeeded in 
implanting both in America policy and in opinion the idea that those who were not with 
us around the earth were against us."145 Kennedy however, took a different view to the 
Third World. The president realized that he may "not always expect to find them 
supporting our view, but we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own 
freedom."146 He sought to use latent moral diplomacy to work towards balancing 
144Arthur Meier Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002), 507. 
145 Schlesinger, 424. 
146Sorensen, Kennedy: The Classic Biography, 540. 
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American interest amongst non-aligned leaders. Kennedy understood that nationalism 
and anti-colonialism would inevitably become hostile to western intrusion. He understood 
that allowing non-committed nations to pursue their desire for complete national 
independence was beneficial to U.S. interest overseas. 
Due to President Kennedy's sophisticated grasp of Third World politics and 
concerns, American policy towards the Third World took a different turn after his 
inauguration. His advisors and associates were passionate and involved in issues of those 
non-aligned parts of the world. In 1961, for example, the U.S. government supported a 
resolution by Liberia to rein in Portugal over its brutal colonial exploitation and to make 
way for a special U.N. enquiry in Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique. While the choice 
was met with deep resentment in Portugal, Kennedy ensured that this U.S. policy shift 
sent clear signals about its changing course with respect to colonial issues. His affable 
personal relations with non-aligned leaders actually won the hearts and minds of Third 
World nations and people far more than U.S. economic aid could had achieve. 147 The 
Lyndon Johnson presidency continued most of the broad outlines of Kennedy's Africa 
policy. However, Johnson lacked the personal charm and honesty of Kennedy in his 
relations with African and Third World leaders. With so much from Vietnam occupying 
presidential decision making on foreign policy, the Johnson administration reverted to the 
policy of minimal interest in African policy except for Congo and South Africa. 148 
Washington's policy towards Africa was therefore one that predated even the 
founding of the United States. The relation with Africa was an evolving one that gained 
147 Marc J. Selverstone, A Companion to John F Kennedy (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley 
& Sons, 2014), chap. 18. 
148 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa. 
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significance in the postwar years when ideological politics rifted the world. The 
progressive social movements of the 1960s at home and a progressive president had 
propelled American actions in the Third World to new and promising direction. What 
toughness could not gain before the 1960s, Kennedy's tact and personal charm achieved 
for U.S. foreign policy in Africa and much of the Third World. The successes of Kennedy 
in Africa showed that personal diplomacy was a far important capital in shaping U.S. 
preeminent place in Africa. While the peculiar material needs of African countries made 
them susceptible to some degrees of U.S. and other Western and Eastern influences, only 
relationships of mutual respect could win the confidence of African leaders and elites in 
toto. 
In this chapter, I have examined briefly how Nkrumah's early life informed his 
ideas about colonialism and the modem needs of an African state. Then, I discussed his 
aims of an industrialized Ghana as a second step in Ghanaian independence. Also, I 
argued that the foreign policy of the Nkrumah administration was self serving in that it 
helped brand Ghana's image in global circles for Accra's decision makers to step on in 
their overall economic diplomacy with richer, powerful states such as the U.S. What's 
more, the complexity of the global environment informed the complexity in Nkrumah's 
actions and choices on the world stage. This chapter also underscored that the U.S. had a 
clear policy aim to limit communist influence in Ghana dating to the early 1950s when 
Ghana entered some measure of self autonomy. I explained that the U.S. policy in Ghana 
was rooted in a long history of U.S. relations with the African continent. That relationship 
even predated the American revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth century. 
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Chapter Three 
Engagement, Aid, and Self-interest 
In this chapter, I examine the actual foreign policy choices of Ghana towards the U.S. and 
the subsequent economic outcomes of those decisions. Using the U.N. as a platform, 
Ghana's behavior in the General Assembly is examined against its material gains from 
Washington to understand how interest informed the alternatives Ghana picked at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. To better contextualize Ghana's behavior, I 
present a brief profile of Nigeria's experience with the U.S aid during the same time. 
The Early Signs of Interaction 
"I want you to come visit us down in Alabama where we are seeking the same 
kind of freedom the Gold Coast is celebrating," Dr. Martin Luther King Jnr., said to Vice 
President Nixon.149 The occasion was Ghana's independence. Dignitaries from around the 
world poured into Accra to celebrate the formal regaining of independence for the small 
West African British Colony formely called the Gold Coast. Dr. King made it clear to 
Nixon that this epic victory against imperialism in Ghana resonated with campaigners 
against race discrimination in the U.S. But while King was pointing out the moral 
significance of the event to Nixon, the real work of guarding the freedom Ghana had won 
was just beginning. In an early address, Kwame Nkrumah indicated that Ghana would 
"never be neutral" in the struggle between the East and West. 150 If Ghana could never 
149 Alex Rivera, "M.L. King Meets Nixon in Ghana," Pittsburgh Courier, March 16, 
1957. 
150 "Nixon Meets Nkrumah; Ghana Marks Independence," The Cornell Daily Sun, March 
5, 1957, Volume LXXIII, Number 98 edition, http://cdsun.library.comell.edu/cgi-
bin/comell?a=d&d=CDS 19570305-01.2.40&e=--------20--1-----all----#. 
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remain uncommitted, then which side of the struggle between East and West was she to 
queue behind? I argue in this chapter that the needs of the young nation dictated the 
direction of its policy. Ghana appeared, for all intents and purposes, ready to develop 
relationships with any nation that would further its development need. How did it seek to 
achieve it national development goals in its interaction with U.S. policy makers? 
that: 
As early as 1950, America recognized, in a State Department Report of 1950, 
We must proceed cautiously and in an orderly manner in our activities in 
Africa, seeking to differentiate between Communist infiltration and the 
justifiable political ambitions of the native population; seeking to dispel 
the suspicion that we may be planning to establish spheres of influence or 
new monopolies. 151 
The U.S. did tread cautiously. This was a new region with its own socio-economic and 
political problems. Recognition in Washington that African nationalism and communism 
were similar in operation but different in ends and ideology was important. Yet, 
identifying leaders with purely nationalist leanings rather than pro-communist sentiments 
became problematic. Almost all great nationalist leaders operated with the organizational 
skill and passion akin to communists while their ideological finesse was always up for 
questioning. Nkrumah was one of such men whose anti-colonial activities attracted the 
151Report Prepared in the Department of State, n.d., FRUS, 1950, Volume 5, The Near 
East, South Asia, and Africa, Eds. John A. Bembaum, Paul Claussen, Joan M. Lee, Carl 
N. Raether, Lisle A. Rose, Charles S. Sampson, and David H. Stauffer (Washington, DC, 
1982), Document 840. 
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State Department's attention in the early 1950s. His speech condemning colonialism and 
strengthening "our ... determination to remove the Colonial Octopus," alarmed Western 
watchers, coming as it did in the early days of the Cold War. 152 But while he harshly 
attacked colonial rule in his speeches to the masses, Nkrumah was measured in his 
relations with the West behind closed doors. To Dean Acheson, Nkrumah wrote that: "I 
can assure you that I shall always endeavor to foster the friendly relations which exist 
between our peoples."153 Such overtures were with a larger aim: to create cordiality with 
decision makers in great power centers as a necessary step for Ghana's long term 
economic interest. This aspiration in the mind of Nkrumah could be traced to his 
experience in the United States as a student. 
From the very beginning, Nkrumah understood the dynamics of the Cold War 
sufficiently. He saw a West vexed about the Soviet Union's inclinations in Africa. But he 
also realized the West was interested in the nature of the future relations it would have 
with Africa. That relationship was necessary given the Cold War's demand for numbers 
and spaces of influence. Nkrumah drove home his grasp of the Cold War when he stated 
in 1957 that Ghana would: 
not be committed in any aspect of its foreign policy and that it should not 
be aligned with any particular group of powers or political bloc. At the 
same time, our new state does not intend to follow a neutralist policy in its 
152The Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State, February 4, 1952, FRUS, 1952-
1954, Volume 11, Part 1, Africa and South Asia, 1952, Eds. Joan M. Lee, David W. 
Mabon, Nina J. Noring, Carl N. Raether, William F. Sanford, Stanley Shaloff, William Z. 
Slany, and Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC, 1983), Document 104." 
153Consul at Accra (Cole) to the Department of State, March 27, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
Volume 11, Part 1, Africa and South Asia, 1952, Eds. Joan M. Lee, David W. Mabon, 
Nina J. Noring, Carl N. Raether, William F. Sanford, Stanley Shaloff, William Z. Slany, 
and Louis J. Smith, (Washington, DC, 1983) Document 108. 
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foreign policy. It is our intention to preserve our independence and to act 
as we see best at any particular time. 154 
Choosing to act in this context helped the new nation maintain balance in the Cold War 
fray in its relations with the East and West. Such a position may have appeared tolerable 
to U.S. political elites like Vice President Nixon, who led the U.S. delegation to Ghana's 
independence celebrations in 1957 .155 
During the early months of Ghanaian independence celebrations, the U.S. scored 
an important diplomatic victory when its pressure ensured that no invitation got extended 
to Red China under Mao Zedong. 156 State Department officials desire an official 
invitation be sent to the Chinese nationalists in Taiwan as the legitimate government of 
China. While this did not seem appealing to the Ghanaian leadership, the U.S. preferred, 
alternatively, to have none of the two Chinas present if it would mean the presence of 
Red China. Additionally, U.S. policy makers convinced Nkrumah that extending an 
invitation to Red China to Ghana's independence celebrations could cause consternation 
in the West. From U.S. Ambassador Donald W. Lamm's conversation with Nkrumah on 
February 11, 1957, it appeared that Nkrumah accepted this explanation of excluding Red 
China though he deferred to the British governor on such matters and requested Lamm to 
talk to Governor Charles Arden Clarke. Eventually, Nkrumah and his party, under British 
154"Legislative Assembly Debate,", Collection 24-5, PRAAD, Accra, March 5, 1957. 
155 "Nixon Meets Nkrumah; Ghana Marks Independence," The Cornell Daily Sun, March 
5, 1957, Volume LXXIII, Number 98 Edition. 
156Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the British Embassy ( de La 
Mare) and the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Mcconaughy), February 6, 
1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume 18, Africa, 1957, Ed. Stanley Shaloff (Washington, 
DC, 1989), Document, 124. 
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pressure and U.S. concerns, did not invite either of the two Chinas to the event. 157 
Nkrumah had weighed the scales very wisely. Ghana would need the United States in the 
long term for economic development. Appearing to be swayed away from the West 
would had create a bad foundation for his relationship with Washington. 
The U.S. also got anxious about an invitation to the Soviet Union to Ghanaian 
independence celebrations as early as 1956. They initiated "plans on continuing 
discussions of this matter informally with the British Embassy" to ensure that the Soviet 
Union did not gain any political advantage in the event of the Gold Coast becoming 
independent.158 Though the Soviet Union did make it to the ceremony, the discourse 
between the U.S. and Ghana over these two incidents of diplomatic representation 
foreshadowed the nature of expectations of relations going into the future. While the two 
Chinas were dropped, Ghana ensured that the Soviet Union was not declined an 
invitation. This helped Ghana navigate the likelihood of appearing to kowtow to the anti-
Communist hysteria of American diplomats. So a sense of independence emerged in 
Nkrumah's external policy early on. The measured diplomatic discussions between 
Ghana and the Soviet Union after the celebrations however, showed that Nkrumah was 
demonstrating tact and pragmatism in the early days of independence. By opening up to 
conversations with the U.S., Nkrumah sought to allay the Americans' communist fears 
while ensuring that such assurances did little to stifle the independence of action of his 
country on the international scene. This was confirmed by the fact that the Soviet Union 
157 There was debate about whether Communist China, on the mainland, could legally be 
recognized as the representing the Chinese people. The other China challenging and 
claiming legitimacy was Taiwan. 
158Instructions from the Department of State to the Consulate General in Accra, February 
20, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume 18, Africa, 1956, Ed. Stanley Shaloff (Washington, 
DC, 1989), Document 123. 
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received diplomatic attention after the independence ceremony though the depth of 
discussion was limited. Here, Nkrumah demonstrated nuance in responding to competing 
interests. 
The diplomatic maneuvering continued between the new cabinet and the U.S. 
consulate after the independence celebration. Ghana had invited the Soviet Union but 
Nkrumah ostensibly avoided the issue of diplomatic representation of the Soviets' in 
Ghana. The Americans were pleased. But such bilateral relations could not be postponed 
in the hope of pleasing other powers. This was bound to eventually cast the new nation in 
bad light in the eyes of some African and Asian nations. In a meeting with consuls from 
United Kingdom, Canada, India, Liberia, France and the U.S. in November 1957, 
Nkrumah revealed his growing inability to hold out against Soviet requests for 
representation in Ghana.159 To make Soviet consular presence less intimidating to his 
government, Nkrumah requested reduced staffing of all consulates at the meeting as a 
basis to limit the Soviets' numerical representation when diplomatic relations were 
established. In other words, Nkrumah held that he and his countrymen were: 
aware of the realities of our time. As we would not have British masters, 
so we would not have Russian masters, or any other masters for that 
matter. It is not our intention to substitute one Imperialism for another. We 
want to be free and independent in the management of our own affairs. 
159Telegram from the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State," November 6, 1957, 
FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume 18, Africa, 1957, Ed. Stanley Shaloff (Washington, DC, 
1989), Document 132. 
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The men and women of the Gold Coast understand freedom .... They are not 
fooled by false prophets. 160 
Nkrumah was therefore clearly aware of the dilemma of the Cold War's rivalry. But he 
adopted a dialogic approach rather seeking to please some other bloc over another. 
Requesting reduced staffing in all embassies weakened Soviet power to influence policy 
but also enabled Nkrumah to navigate the Soviets' reservations about the U.S. and its 
allies presence in Ghana. The U.S. representative, in a private chat after the meeting, 
pressed Nkrumah about his own political views in a subtle way. Clearly, the pro-Western 
leaning of Nkrumah was not comprehensively convincing to Americans. Nonetheless, the 
search for solutions through a dialogic approach revealed Nkrumah's conviction about 
the appropriateness of interaction in resolving distrusts engendered by the Cold War. It 
was to Ghana's merit that that all nations were evenly represented at its independence 
given the promise their presence presaged for the economic future of the new nation. 
Despite these early diplomatic successes, the debate about Ghana's political 
loyalty within Cold War contexts continued after liberation. During his 1958 visit to the 
United States, Nkrumah waxed eloquent about an agreeable solution to the problem in the 
Middle East which appeared appealing to Washington. The New York Times remarked, 
based on Nkrumah's Middle Eastern policy suggestions, that "The State Department saw 
the nationalism of his year-old country and the promise of his African leadership as a 
possible future counter-balance to rampant nationalism spreading from the Mideast. "161 
The sense then was that Nkrumah gravitated in his statements towards the West in those 
early months of independence. It is important to recognize that as U.S. educated, 
160Timothy Bankole, Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1963), 164. 
161"Nkrumah Proposes a Neutral Mideast," New York Times, August 4, 1958. 
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Nkrumah's inclination to the West was rooted in his experience of U.S. culture and 
outlook. The nature of Ghana's social and economic system, shape by its culture and 
British colonial legacy, also made overtures from the East very unattractive to Ghana. 
Nkrumah affirmed this that: "our better institutions ... do not allow the ideology to have 
any fruitful set-up in our country."162 Ghana therefore appeared, to all intents and 
purposes, to be practicing a westward tilted form non-alignment with immerse range of 
choices on a variety of external policy options. 
Nkrumah continued to tout the capitalistic, westward leaning nature of Ghanaian 
policies to all U.S. diplomats who cared to listen. He led efforts at turning Guinean leader 
Sekou Toure, for instance, from an eastward leaning president to a Western inclined 
leader. 163 There was therefore, an ongoing process of understanding of American political 
aims and African expectations after independence. Yet, in those early days Nkrumah and 
his advisors positioned national economic self interest at the center of decisions on which 
nations to interact with and how. 
From 1957 to 1960, Ghana practiced a form of positive neutrality which 
enabled it stay aloof the struggles between East and West in international politics. But 
even this neutrality was one which tilted westward. For example, in declining to meet the 
Russian Prime Minister the same day he was scheduled to talk to the U.S. president in 
162Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Jdealogy, 139. 
163 Nkrumah questioned Toure on Communist presence in Guinea for over two hours in 
June 1958 during the latter's visit to Ghana. It also appears that America took a serious 
view of Nkrumah's suggestions on America's African policy. See, Telegram From the 
Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State, July 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Volume 
14, Africa, 1960, Eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff, (Washington, DC, 
1992), Document 297. 
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1960, Nkrumah clearly made a show of his pro-Western bias.164 But the inclination 
towards the West never diminished Ghana's independence of thought and action on the 
global stage. When he spoke at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1960, for 
instance, Nkrumah boldly pointed out that "the problem in the Congo is an acute African 
problem which can be solved by Africans only."165 In other words, he emphasized 
African capacity to resolve their problems alone. Political autonomy meant what it was. 
Nkrumah called for an all-African military force in the Congo and pressed for lesser 
Western involvement. While such a position shocked the State Department, U.S. 
diplomats came to the realization, gradually, that Ghana could not be depended on to act 
and think in a way that furthered U.S. interests in Africa. The whole Congo dilemma 
marked the beginning of real disagreement between Ghanaian and American views on 
African policy. Not that there were no disagreements. In fact, questions of colonial rule, 
disarmament, and nuclear tests in the Sahara were points of disagreement between both 
countries. Nonetheless, these were kept at a manageable level. Ghana ensured that its 
westward leaning posture did not limit its autonomy in global decision making. 
To express the positive neutrality of Ghana further, the Ghanaian administration 
agreed to accept the first Peace Corp volunteers in Africa and the Third World. Peace 
Corp Director Sargent Shriver and President Kennedy saw the Peace Corp as an emblem 
of U.S. morality and idealism. Sending young men to other nations as volunteers helped 
164Memorandum of Conversation, September 22, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume 14, 
Africa, 1960, Eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff, (Washington, DC, 1992), 
Document 301. 
165 Kwame Nkrumah, "Speech to the United Nations General Assembly" (Kwame 
Nkrumah Info Bank, September 23, 1960), 
http://www.nkrumahinfobank.org/article.php?id=380&c=46. 
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exhibit American philanthropic gesture to the rest of the world. 166 The Ghanaian 
administration used the Peace Corps to facilitate education expansion, agriculture, and 
other technical needs critical to the Ghanaian economy. 
The pursuit of interaction was not a desire expressed only by Africans but the 
U.S. as well. The United States government needed to keep such conversations on-going 
too. While seeking friends in the race against Russia, the United States had to assure 
smaller nations of its own goodwill towards them. It was not just Nkrumah and his ilk 
who sought to negotiate their nations' independence with the force of international 
politics. It was also America's responsibility to convince periphery nations of the 
genuineness of U.S. intents towards them. In 1958, Deputy Secretary of State Raymond 
Hare was paraphrased as indicating that: 
"USG has neither political nor economic imperialistic designs; that only 
thing American people and their government want is to see that 
development of strong political and economic systems which will permit 
the full cultural expression of the people within these countries as regards 
their political development. "167 
This two-way approach to politics built trust and assured the utmost political cooperation 
between the Ghana and the U.S. While interests guided and informed the nature of 
166Elizabeth C. Hoffman, All You Need Is Love (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000). Hoffman discusses the early history of the Peace Corp and the role Ghana played 
in it. She consistently highlights the moral imperative the Peace Corp gave U.S. policy in 
Africa throughout this book. 
167"Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State, July 3, 1960, 
FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume 14, Africa, 1960, Eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley 
Shaloff, (Washington, DC, 1992), Document 297" 
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discussions, Ghana and the U.S. both wanted a relationship that helped them achieve 
progress and contribute to global good. 168 
Early interactions between Ghanaian and U.S. policy makers therefore deepened 
cooperation in the later years and formed a foundation upon which further collaboration 
was built. 
The Place of Aid in US-Ghana Relations 
After Vice President Nixon completed his 1957 visit to Accra, he returned to the 
Eisenhower White House with a new view of Africa. Firstly, he advocated a separate 
division for African affairs within the State Department. He also advised greater focus on 
Ghana in Washington's grand policy in Africa. Focusing on Accra meant U.S. policy had 
to grasp the needs of the Ghanaian state in order to produce plans and actions that would 
best convince policy makers in Accra to rope them into the U.S. policy spheres. Foreign 
aid was one policy instrument the U.S. employed in refocusing more attention on Ghana. 
In 1957, the U.S. disbursed about three and half million dollars of aid to the Ghanaian 
government representing 0.49% of total aid between that year and 1966. While this was 
not significant compared with other years, the aid helped Ghana in the critical area of 
national defense because modernizing an army and the security system were priorities of 
168 Hans Morgenthau explained power and interest as defining an anarchic world system. 
The United States desired global power and leadership. In that regard, the U.S. framed its 
relations with Ghana in mostly in hegemonic terms so that any material gains or other 
interests Ghana had could only be possible if that nation recognized American hegemony. 
Ghana, on the other hand, desired economic development mostly in the form of 
industrialization and investment. For this reason, leaders in Ghana subtly tied recognition 
of American interests to the latter's willingness to support Ghana achieve its economic 
aims. These divergent aims of Ghana and the United States buttress Morgenthau's view 
of international politics as one moderated by interest and power. See, Hans Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (New York: Knoph, New 
York). 
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the Ghanaian administration. Though Nkrumah had earlier said that "Ghana's foreign 
policy would not be based on a need for foreign assistance," such assistance was vital to 
setting up new institutions in the new state. 169 A look at the first three years of Ghana's 
U.N voting reveals that Nkrumah gave action to his words. While Ghana voted "Yes" on 
many issues, its record of abstention, compared to the United States' was higher. When a 
resolution exhorting the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russian to reduce 
their military budget and accelerate disarmament came up in the general assembly in 
1958, Ghana abstained from the vote. Given the controversy surrounding disarmament, 
Nkrumah and his advisors needed to toe a truly neutralist line to appear acceptable to all 
sides in the debate over disarmament. With big powers contesting this point, it was 
suicidal for Ghana's economic interest to vote on the resolution as it would incur the 
disaffection of one or other Cold War rivals. 
On the controversial question of recognition of North Korea, Ghana also 
abstained on a number of occasions. While those abstentions may appear insignificant, 
one must remember the industrial and economic development needs of Ghana to 
understand its actions at the center of global politics. In fact, abstaining from a vote 
established some level of agency. That agency was one that enabled Nkrumah and his 
men to dictate how they wanted to be seen and interacted with by politicians of the 
powerful global centers. It also allowed them to "translate an international profile into 
169Kwame Nkrumah, "Ghana Is Free for Forever" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 
1957), 
http://www.bbc.co. uk/worldservice/focusonafrica/news/story/2007/02/070129 _ghana50 _i 
ndependence _ speech. shtml.. 
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political or economic resources that would serve domestic purposes". 170 The domestic 
needs that explain such careful, subtle choices were varied as already noted in the last 
chapter. It is therefore not far-fetched to conclude that abstentions from certain 
resolutions were to maintain neutrality as a means to guaranteeing sustained economic 
diplomacy with all the great powers. National and economic development were therefore 
the chief focus of Nkrumah's external activities and it did not matter where the resources 
came from. U.S. diplomats acknowledged this when they pointed out that "Nkrumah still 
intended to preserve his independence from Soviet domination, although he certainly 
expected to seek increasing help from the bloc". 171 That there was this understanding and 
that continuous discussions were ongoing between Ghana and the U.S. in the light of the 
former's voting pattern points to Ghanaian pragmatism towards rather than subservience 
to Washington. While the United States economic aid to Ghana and further pledges of aid 
towards key projects were significant explanations for the nature of Ghana's vote in the 
General Assembly vis-a-vis U.S. interests, we must see it not as a master-servant 
relationship. Rather, Ghana acted in an assuredly self-interested manner not in subjection 
to the U.S. but in projecting its economic interests in relations with Washington. 
The perceptive approach to decision making by the Ghanaian government paid 
off. President Kennedy approved substantial aid in 1961 and 1962 to finance the Volta 
River Project, a boost to Ghana's industrialization efforts. Total aid for those years stood 
at 79.9% out of the cumulative total for the years under review. Between 1960 and 1962, 
the U.S. and Ghanaian voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly, in mere numerical 
170Khadiagala and Lyons, African Foreign Policies, 4. 
171Notes for the Record, December 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume 21, Africa, 1963, 
Ed., Nina Davis Howland, (Washington, DC, 1995), Document 240. 
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terms, converged more. The concurrence in international outlook appear to buttress 
Hwang, Sanford, and Lee's assertion that the Cold War made aid an attractive tool by 
superpowers to extract policy concurrence from less endowed states on the global 
scene.172 But in the case of Ghana and the U.S. in these years, it seemed to be the case 
that on issues essential to U.S. interests Accra avoided voting or went along with the U.S. 
This however, precluded matters at the heart of Ghanaian policy in the Third World and 
Africa. Therefore, Ghana did not rubber stamp every matter of interest to Washington on 
the General Assembly. For instance, Ghana increased its anti-colonial stance in the U.N. 
General Assembly while the American delegation tended to abstain from or out-rightly 
oppose crucial votes pertaining to colonial questions. The U.S. abstained on resolutions 
on Algerian (1960) and South-West Africa (1960), and opposed those concerning South 
Africa (1962), Mwami (1960), and Southern Rhodesia (1962). In those circumstances, 
Ghana went counter to the U.S. position. It is not out of place to state that the U.S. 
position on colonial issues rather placed it in dilemma. On the one hand, the U.S. was an 
ex-colony so that ideologically it should had supported anti-colonial forces. On the other 
hand, Cold War rhetoric and calculations compelled policy makers in Washington to 
support NATO allies in the General Assembly on colonial matters. This became a point 
of disagreement between the U.S. and African nations including Ghana. It could not, 
under those circumstances, expect Ghanaian compliance on such highly moralistic issue. 
The figure below shows a comparison of U.N voting pattern between Ghana and the 
United States. 
172Wonjae Hwang, Amanda G. Sanford, and Junhan Lee, "Does Membership on the UN 
Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," International 
Interactions 41, no. 2 (March 15, 2015): 256-78, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.982114. 
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Figure 1: Ghanaian and American Votes on UN General Assembly resolutions, 1957 -
1974. 
Following the fulfillment of commitments to Ghana on the Volta River Project, 
U.S. aid to Ghana fell sharply to single digit levels after 1962. Ghana became 
increasingly concerned with problems of neo-colonial interventions in the Congo as well 
as colonial brutalities in Portuguese colonies about which the United States acted against 
the cause of freedom. Thompson has noted that the Congo problem marked the point of 
severance for Ghana in its relations with the United States.173 A mark of this rift was that 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) did not carry out many 
programs of development in Ghana once the fissure over the Congo became palpable. 
Not until the coup of 1966 did USAID resume it activities at full length. While Kennedy 
and Nkrumah disagreed over what approach was most appropriate in Congo, Kennedy 
tended to think in terms of what the United States expected Ghana to do rather than what 
173 Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966. 
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Accra's concerns were in the matter. For example, he held grave concerns about "certain 
political and economic policies" of the Ghanaian government. 174 On the other hand, 
Nkrumah aimed at "negotiations toward an agreement limiting East-West involvement in 
African affairs. "175 The divide over the Congo led to consequences in the economic 
relations between the two nations as evidenced by the decreases in aid after 1962. 
From 1963 till the coup, aid levels to Ghana declined. Aggregate aid amounts 
between 1963 and 1965 stood at 8.5% of overall aid to the Nkrumah administration from 
1957. Only critical sectors like agriculture, the Peace Corps, and defense, specifically 
professionalizing the military, were given priority in the disbursement of aid. When the 
Ghanaian administration initiated a Seven Year Development Plan, Washington helped 
by "contributing heavily to projects included in the plan" to the tune of about 21 % of the 
projected expenditure of the plan.176 But these did not represent the kind of aid the United 
States expended on other nations like Ethiopia. As foreign policy disagreements in the 
Congo deepened, Washington used economic diplomacy to limit the financial options of 
Nkrumah. In denying Ghana aid when it needed it most under Nkrumah, the U.S. was 
attempting to show its hegemonic power in an effort to whip Ghana into line with U.S. 
foreign policy interests. The U.S. therefore clearly used foreign aid in this instance as an 
174 "Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah", FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume 
21, Africa, Nina Davis Howland, ed., (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1995). 
175Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana, February 7, 1963, 
FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume 21, Africa, 1963, Ed. Nina Davis Howland, (Washington, 
DC, 1995) Document 250. 
176 Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
(Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) April 9, 1964, 
FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Nina Davis Howland, ed., (Washington DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1999). 
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instrument for achieving certain foreign policy ends, in this case, riddance of an 
unfavorable civilian administration. Despite these, the Nkrumah administration stayed its 
anti-imperialist cause in the Congo and the whole of Africa showing its capacity for 
agency and action in the hostile Cold War environment. 
The choices became limited for Nkrumah from 1963 onwards in his relations with 
the U.S. Washington no more appeared interested in carrying on with negotiations over 
the important issue of the Congo. There was therefore a limit to how engaging Nkrumah 
could get with Washington at this time because the U.S. seem to have made up its mind 
about covertly supporting Belgian efforts to derail Congolese independence. Not only 
was Ghana ignored but Nigeria and other important states on the continent were brushed 
off in an effort to get to the resources of the Congo by restoring Belgium's indirect, neo-
colonialist hold over the Congo. Yet, it would be misleading to assume that 
disengagement with Nkrumah on the Congo implied a rejection of interaction as a 
foundational component of the Cold War in Africa. Rather, the U.S. found equally 
willing elements for interaction in the Congo mainly in the person of Joseph Desire 
Mobutu. So, interaction continued but in different quarters other than Nkrumah's. 
The impact of the decreasing consensus and subsidies for Ghana was that the U.S. 
and Ghana differed significantly in their U.N. voting behavior after 1962. At a time when 
the U.S. voted moderately affirmative, Ghana tended to vote "Yes" on issues more 
frequently. On nuclear proliferation and colonial freedoms, America remained staunchly 
opposed to resolutions in the General Assembly. On the contrary, Ghana cast affirmative 
votes on many of these issues. In previous years, Ghana exercised circumspection and 
moderation over such resolutions. But the post-1962 voting pattern highlight Ghanaian 
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pull back from moderation in favor of forceful policy choices in the General Assembly. 
Another observation from Table 1 is that defense aid to Ghana went down drastically 
between 1964 and 1966. More U.S. aid went into agriculture than to defense. Because the 
majority of the population engaged in agriculture, increased aid to this sector meant 
putting American money directly into the hands of ordinary Ghanaians. With Nkrumah's 
rising power, this particular alteration in U.S. aid policy might have been aimed at 
curbing the Ghanaian government's ability to use oppression against its people or better 
equipped it for aggression as a supposedly anti-Western state. Overall however, aid to 
Ghana from other quarters continued. Walter Coleshill, second secretary at the British 
High Commission, recalled that "many countries continued to aid Ghana because they 
wanted Ghana to vote their way at the United Nations."177 
An effective way to further situate aid in this narrative is to briefly touch on the 
nature of U.S. aid to Ghana after the coup that ousted Nkrumah. For instance, U.S. aid 
more than tripled immediately after the coup that ousted Nkrumah to almost $200 
million, up from $54 million in 1966. Those increases were significant given that an 
earlier State Department memoir in 1965 stated that: "the United States should not 
acquiesce in Nkrumah's forthcoming request for financial assistance. Not only would a 
refusal be justified in the interests of further weakening Nkrumah but, m 
Ambassador Mahoney's opinion, 'such a refusal would make a desirable impression on 
other countries in Africa. "'178 Large increases in aid followed the first two years after 
Nkrumah. Nevertheless, the increase did not remain constant. The aid policy 
177 "Country and Subject Readers Series: Ghana," sec. Ghana: Country Reader, page 44. 
178Memorandum of Conversation, March 11, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume 24, 
Africa, 1965, Ed. Nina Davis Howland, (Washington, DC, 1999), Document 251. 
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inconsistency signals that aid was used to help a new, supposedly friendly regime get on 
its feet in its early years. With Nkrumah's overthrow, Ghana's political leverage in the 
Cold War dwindled into one of irrelevance. The Ghanaian military regime was "almost 
pathetically pro-Western."179 High aid levels instituted immediately after Nkrumah were 
not sustained. They fell as Ghana settled into the U.S. orbit by the 1970s. This shows that 
Nkrumah's discerning foreign policy behavior accrued material benefits to the country in 
ways that future leaders' conformist foreign policies could not. He was successful 
because he spoke and acted with a purpose which sometimes complicated Ghanaian 
decisions and how the world understood Ghana. Nkrumah came across in that sense as 
calculating and shrewd. The products of Nkrumah's external policy can be seen in the 
infrastructure and development programs the U.S. poured into Ghana during his 
administration. 
By the 1970s when the United States reduced aid levels to successive Ghanaian 
governments, Ghana posed neither a major Cold War threat to United States interests in 
Africa nor offered competition to U.S. foreign policy designs in Africa. In fact, General 
N.A. Aferi, Ghanaian Commissioner for External Affairs, lamented in July 1972 that "we 
are unhappy to see Ghana in such obscurity" in foreign policy. 180 During critical votes 
that affected the U.S. interests, Ghana went pro-American. For instance, the resolution on 
sea resources (AR/RES/2574) in 1969 and comprehensive review of peace keeping 
operations (AR/RES/2220) in late 1966 were two important ones that saw Ghana actually 
179 "Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson," March 12, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume 
XXIV, Africa. Ed Nina Davis Howland, (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1999). 
180 West Africa, July 7, 1972. 
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siding with the United States. The value of aid in such decisions cannot be discounted. In 
real terms, Ghana went westwards on major policy resolutions while tending to continue 
the anti-colonial rhetoric of the past in the U.N. General Assembly in solidarity with 
Third World nations. Because resolutions on colonialism were numerous, Ghana's 
affirmations tended to move it away from the United States in terms of sheer numbers of 
votes. But on major policy resolutions, Ghana and the U.S. concurred more than they 
differed. 
Table 1: Breakdown of Foreign Assistance to Ghana from the U.S. 
Year Agriculture Defense Peace USAID Total Aid Percentages 
Corp Amount 
1957 $669,713 2,678,854 3,348,567 0.49% 
1958 6,499 1,299,822 1,306,321 0.19% 
1959 4,480,488 6,400,698 10,881,186 1.6% 
1960 631,246 5,681,217 6,312,463 0.9% 
1961 6,226,628 9,962,606 124,532,577 140,721,811 20.7% 
1962 4,314,638 11,741,978 3,081,884 382,153,673 401,261,355 59% 
1963 3,653,185 10,508,996 4,262,049 18,265,926 2.7% 
1964 12,030,650 7,218,390 4,812,260 24,061,300 3.5% 
1965 4,729,424 7,094,136 5,,320,602 17,144,162 2.5% 
1966 38,774,617 10,417,061 4,051,079 1,157,451 54,400,208 8.0% 
Source: USAIDAid Trend Data/or Ghana, 2016. 
What could had been? 
The nature of diplomatic relations between Ghana and the United States could 
have been better handled to avoid the kind of deterioration suffered in the mid-1960s. 
Continued U.S. aid into mid-1960s would have helped Nkrumah's administration remain 
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relevant in the eyes of the people. This would have smoothened Ghana's ability to 
execute the domestic agenda it set out. Though development would have been facilitated, 
there was no guarantee that the encroachment on the liberties of the opposition under 
Nkrumah would had abated. Rather, Nkrumah's leadership could probably have fared 
like that of Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore where a dictatorship sacrifices liberal democracy 
for national development. A unique feature of Nkrumah's administration was its ability to 
co-opt some opposition elements into government and that trend could have continued. 
With sustained U.S. aid, the administration would have absorbed more prominent dissent 
elements into government and weaken the opposition in the long term. 
In such a climate, U.S. influence would wax expansive despite disagreements 
over questions relating to Africa. Public goodwill for the U.S. would have blossomed due 
in part to the visible projects undertaken with U.S. aid. Nkrumah's ability to silence anti-
W estem elements in his party might had been successful in those circumstances. He 
would then afford an opening to engage more with the U.S. over important African policy 
matters. Here, it is important to state that we must never overestimate Nkrumah's sway 
over his party or the nation. There were powerful camps contesting for influence in policy 
in the party. Nkrumah did not have unrestrained control over those forces. U.S. ill-will 
emboldened the anti-Western section of the party to gain prominence around the 
president. Also, the media culture of Ghana from the pre-independence years made it 
difficult for Nkrumah to effectively rein in both his party and opposition elements the 
way the West expected. Washington's decision to lessen aid only weakened the pro-West 
camp's sway over Nkrumah. With reduced aid, the administration, with all its efficiency 
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and effectiveness in executing domestic policy, lacked the plentitude of resources to 
advance national development.181 
The Story of Nigeria 
While Ghana was going through changing phases of diplomacy with the United 
States, its neighbor, Nigeria, started out well both in expectation and practice in its 
external relations with the United States. A close look at the story of Nigeria reveals a 
much different trajectory which helps effectively illuminate the case of Cold war politics 
in U.S.-Ghanaian relations. The relationship between Nigeria and the United States began 
formally in 1960 following the former's gaining of independence from Britain. Nigeria 
came onto the world scene as an avowed neutral in world affairs. But even that neutrality, 
according to Olajide Aluko, "remained extremely partial to the Western Powers."182 If 
statistics have meaning, then the U.S. response to Nigerian claims of positive neutrality 
can be seen in the quantum of aid received in the early years of independence. U.S. aid to 
Nigeria started at about US$12 million ($11,993,681) in 1960 and increased about 700% 
by 1963 ($183,268,142). Nigeria's Africa policy was still taking shape in those days, and 
there were not many disagreements between Nigeria and the United States. 
But Nigeria's commitment to the U.S. interests diverged on racial and colonial 
issues in Rhodesian and South African due to those states' white minority regimes. 
181 Dr Obed Yao Asamoah, The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013): The Experience 
of a Non-Conformist (Bloomington. IN: AuthorHouse, 2014), chap. 3. Asamoah recounts 
the clear human rights violations the new military government and later, civilian 
administration perpetuated on individuals known to have served in the previous Nkrumah 
administration. The right to stand for elections and other important political rights were 
striped off these men despite the rhetoric of democracy and rule of law. For a discussion 
of the ineffectiveness of the post-Nkrumah military and civilian administrations, see first-
hand accounts of American diplomats in, "Country and Subject Readers Series: Ghana." 
182 Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States, 173. 
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Another point of disagreement was the Congo. Though these incongruities of opinions 
existed, the U.S. and Nigeria fostered good relations so that aids flowed consistently into 
Lagos in the early 1960s. Whereas Ghana suffered aid reduction there remained sustained 
concern for Nigeria in Washington due primarily to a sense that Nigeria was inclined to 
the West though it was opposed western intrusion or activities in Africa. For instance, 
Nigeria, in true anti-colonial spirit, warned in the General Assembly of the U.N. that: 
"Either the Western Powers prefer to stain their hands with the precious blood of our 
people until we can tolerate it no longer or they should join hands with all men who abhor 
oppression and exploitation to fight apartheid and thereby remain true friends of 
Africa."183 Despite those disagreements, the U.S. sustained its aid program to Lagos 
because it probably looked at Nigeria more as a democracy which was less concerned 
with jeopardizing Western interests. Aid to such an administration would not have in any 
way set back U.S. interests and aims.184 
In 1964, a significant increase in subventions up to U.S$306,781,608 helped the 
USAID run numerous projects in Nigeria. The focuses of these programs were 
professional and technical education, agriculture, industry, and private investment.185 
Beginning in 1966, the State Department found it increasingly difficult to increase aid to 
Nigeria due to rising ethnic tensions which led to civil war. When Biafra hostilities broke 
183 Okoi Arikpoi, "Statement to the Twenty-Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the 
U.N.," October 16, 1970. Cited in Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States, 171-72. 
184 Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid 
Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," World 
Politics 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 294-323, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008121. 
They posit that an amenable mien towards the West influenced quantities of aid flow to 
rioor and developing nations. 
85 Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss, Foreign Aid and Foreign 
Policy (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 
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out, uncertainties caused a delay in U.S. reaction. For this reason, aid levels went down in 
1967 and 1968 compared to the two years immediately before and after. In 1969, U.S. aid 
to Nigeria hit new heights with a record US$452 million. But most of the support came in 
the form of humanitarian aid showing U.S. emphasis of its neutrality in the civil war. The 
dwindling of Biafran fortunes explained much of the hikes in aid in 1969. Nonetheless, 
only aid that put U.S. in a neutral position in the civil war increased. Though the Civil 
War in Nigeria checked U.S. desire to pour substantial aid into Nigeria, the absence of 
major Cold War disagreements in U.S.-Nigerian relations, compared to U.S.-Ghana 
relations, made the continuous release of U.S. aid to Nigeria possible. With U.S. Nigerian 
investment at about 800 million in 1969, Washington used aid to cultivate good working 
relationships with Lagos to guarantee the safety of those investments. For instance, 
defense aid as a component of U.S. aid to Nigeria declined significantly to about half in 
1970 ($52,216,047) from what was given in 1965 ($101,682,625). Nevertheless, other 
forms of aid remained consistently sufficient during the war to allow the Nigerian 
government to deliver vital social and economic changes. By doing so, the U.S. indirectly 
supported the federal government of Nigeria in a way that sustained it from discomfort 
during the war. This can be explained as rooted in Nigeria's pro-Western approach 
compared to its neighbor, Ghana. Neither was it engaged in internationally promoting 
ideas and efforts that questioned the moral underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy in 
Africa. Ghana, on the other hand, projected its image as a moral leader in Africa ready to 
question the basis of western presence on the continent while courting both Western and 
Eastern attention.186 
186 It is critical to remember that Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966) had a soft spot for the West 
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From 1965 to 1970, voting in the General Assembly between the U.S. and Nigeria 
shifted apart. The U.S. adopted a cautious attitude in the General Assembly between 1965 
and 1970 as reflected in their voting behavior. They abstained from or rejected 
resolutions in the General Assembly far often than affirmed them. Nigeria however, 
voted less cautiously on colonial issues. It was more measured in controversial votes 
tangential to Cold War politics. U.S. aid to Nigerian in 1967 and 1968 aside, much of the 
aid in the 1960s were substantial.187 Below is a diagram showing U.N. voting patterns of 
Nigeria and the U.S. 
in his foreign policy. He contributed less to freedom fighting in Africa than his Ghanaian 
counterpart, Nkrumah. His reluctance to pursue an aggressive policy against colonialism 
like Ghana attracted the ire of some sections of the Nigerian parliament. On the contrary, 
Ghana pursued an active role in freedom fighting on the continent. It supported, trained 
and protected nationalists, both militants and passive resisters, in Ghana as a contribution 
to the African freedom fighting efforts. For a detailed discussion ofTafawa Balewa's 
non-align policy see, Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States, chap. 9. 
187 Total aid for the late 1960s was: 1965 ($194,497,578), 1966 ($174,775,142), 1967 
($150,501,786), 1968 ($139,546,935), 1969 ($452,162,963) and 1970 ($237,927,833). 
These are figures from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Aid Trend Data website. 
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Figure 2: Ghanaian, Nigerian and American Votes on UN General Assembly 
resolutions, 1957-1974. Courtesy, Dag Hammarskjold UN Library. 
I have discussed Ghana's foreign policy choices at the U.N. General Assembly 
and how those choices highlighted convergence and dissonance with U.S. interests. Next, 
I correlated U.S. aid data to Ghana's voting pattern in the General Assembly to explain 
the changing nature of relations between the two countries due to diminishing economic 
and policy gains from each other. I showed that decreasing U.S. aid to Ghana was due to 
the unfriendly and hostile posture of Accra to Washington's global interests, especially in 
the Congo. To highlight this further, I contrasted this relationship with post-Nkrumah 
regimes' relations with Washington and Nigeria's relations with the U.S. I contend that 
the favorability towards these two other regimes reveal a certain antagonism to Nkrumah 
rooted in his belligerence to U.S. interests in Africa in the 1960s. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusion 
The Cold War was, in a sense, a dialogic relationship among actors- superpowers and 
Third World states. Self-interest stood out in defining the nature, extent, and length of the 
interaction among the actors. This self-interest especially informed the choices of 
periphery states despite that they were seen as fragile and without agency in their 
relationships with the West and East. In U.S.-Ghana relations, the Ghanaian 
administration had palpable development needs that influenced the nature of its 
interaction with Washington. The U.S., on the other hand, employed aid as an instrument 
of policy in response to Ghanaian industrial development needs to then constrain Soviet 
influence in Ghana. The Ghanaian authorities saw the impasse between the West and East 
as opportunity for attaining policy and material concessions from both sides of the Cold 
War divide. Despite the conscious efforts at extracting gains from main actors in the Cold 
War, Ghana did not take such generosity as a mark of dominance and limitation on its 
own external policy designs in Africa or the Third World. Charles Adorn Boateng 
summarized this succinctly that: "Nkrumah's decision to draw closer to Eastern Europe 
was a means of expressing in concrete terms Ghana's freedom of action. Ghana found 
herself standing between the two world giants, compelled by her need to draw on both for 
technical and economic aid. Thus as a non-aligned state, Ghana could maximize her aid 
as she could obtain loans from both the East and the West."188 In short, Ghana was not 
silenced by the subventions it received from Washington. 
188 Charles Adorn Boateng, The Political Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, vol. 66, 
African Studies (Lampeter, Ceredigion, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), 109. 
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The Ghanaian state ably crafted foreign policy in a way that gave it conspicuity 
on the global scene and such an international image providing a conduit to attracting the 
political and material gains to execute domestic policy. The image embellishment did not 
truncate Ghana's other genuine, altruistic policies like anti-colonialism and opposition to 
nuclear warfare. Rather, there emerged mutual accommodation of these varied aims in 
the policy making process in Ghana. 
Where the U.S. saw the Cold War as a struggle between good and evil, Ghana 
spotted opportunity for a relationship that would inure to the its advantage through 
technological and economic transfer from Washington. This dissonance in goals between 
the West and peripheral states such as Ghana did make dialogue sometimes grueling but 
not impossible. Interactions persisted to find common ground through occasional trade 
off and concessions. Even, the fact that debates over the meaning of neutrality transpired 
between Ghana and the U.S. highlight a dialogic rapport rather than a domineering 
relationship between Washington and Accra. 
The robustness of Ghana's agency in its relations with the U.S. also shows the 
interventionist assumption to be inadequate in explaining periphery states' presence in the 
Cold War environment. Interventionism diminishes the subtle transaction of power on the 
part of Ghana in its relations with superpowers such as the U.S. In pursuing neutrality, 
Ghana was not a dependable Western or Eastern ally in pure Cold War terms. It tended to 
cultivate others and act based on a set of domestic policy aims which could not be served 
by only one superpower. Absolute alignment with one bloc limited Ghana's options and 
interactional power. Bias towards one or the other Cold War bloc would had restrained 
Ghana's dialogue with those other centers of power where there were also likelihood of 
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material, economic, technological and even military gains for the young nation. Pursuing 
a midpoint foreign policy path thus enabled Ghana to proceed with this interactional Cold 
War association with the United States while maintaining meaningful relations with 
others. The conversational U.S.-Ghana foreign policy relationship therefore defies the 
interventionist interpretation of the Cold War. The relations evinced a more global but 
interactional approach to Cold War studies. 
The interactionist approach to Cold War studies better explains the dialogic 
relations between Ghana and the U.S. during the crucial Nkrumah years. In fact, so 
personal was the relationship between Nkrumah and Kennedy that Lyndon Johnson 
constantly referenced this as a point in his correspondence with Nkrumah. 189 The positive 
interaction among both Third World and Western leaders provided opportunity for some 
states to contribute to the global policy making process far in excess of their size, wealth 
and power. Ghana punched far above its abilities on the international scene due primarily 
to interactional relations it had with powers such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The 
communication and power politicking between Ghana and the U.S. facilitated Nkrumah 
and his advisors' domestic goals of conquering modernity for the Ghanaian people. So 
while Ghanaian and U.S. interests were not always synonymous, they had rapport which 
was discernible through the mutual deference between diplomats. What that reveals is 
that the Cold War facilitated conversation, interaction and debate between periphery 
nations and those at the center of the struggle. Leaders like Nkrumah chose to use the 
189 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana, July 3, 1960, 
FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume 14, Africa, 1960, Eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley 
Shaloff, (Washington, DC, 1992), Document 297 
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interactions to further their image and in tum boost the material gains such imaging 
inured for their countries. 
Lastly, Nkrumah's relations with the U.S. challenge the conventional literature 
that he was either pro-Western or pro-Eastern. Nkrumah was a pan-Africanist at heart. He 
craved for the material uplifting of African people through technology and industrial 
growth. The Ghanaian foreign policy makers, together with Nkrumah, picked those 
alternatives that guaranteed material progress for the Ghanaian people. The policy 
making process and the global environment within which they emerged were complex. 
Nkrumah himself sometimes exhibited deliberate contrariety in his actions and 
pronouncements on the world stage precisely in order to navigate the complex 
international environment in which he found himself. His actions and the choices 
Ghanaian diplomats made in foreign policy all reveal the intricate nature of their thinking 
and choices. It is important to reinterpret the Nkrumah administration's foreign policy 
choices and domestic policies as closely aligned and mutually inclusive. This way, we 
would understand the administration's decisions better without the simplistic, dual 
categorization into pro-Western or pro-Eastern policies. What all these show is that 
Nkrumah, his foreign policy and the environment within which he made his choices were 
far more complex than we previously assumed. 
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